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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the twentieth century, the proliferation of new States has not declined in the twenty first 
century. Several small territories have declared themselves as sovereign States by claiming 
statehood in international law. These developments have a significant measure in many 
respects of international law notions of self-determination, secession, recognition and de-
colonisation.  
States remain primary subjects of international law. Despite the fundamental legal 
framework on creation of States enshrined in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States, 1933 (Montevideo Convention), the creation of States and unilateral 
secession remain part of the controversial and unsettled issues of international law. This is 
because of the legal and factual situation that evolves around the concepts of State creation 
and unilateral secession. 
Besides, while the legal framework on State creation is in place, other new criteria 
continue to develop, alongside are concepts of unilateral secession and self-determination. It 
therefore follows that in any given situation of contemporary international law, the concepts 
of State creation, secession and self-determination cannot be discussed in isolation.  
In this thesis, I will analyse the notions of statehood, secession and recognition. I will 
argue that in contemporary international law or post-colonial era, unilateral secession and 
satisfying the traditional criteria of statehood does not qualify the clamant entity to become a 
new State. Secondly, I will argue that although recognition is not a rule of customary 
international law, State practice on recognition and other suggested criteria play a significant 
role with regards to creation of States in international law.  
Thirdly, the Republic of Somaliland – the case study, will be analysed against the 
criteria of statehood and the application thereof. The study will also provide a general 
analysis of a few specific cases of successful and unsuccessful attempts at secession. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The main focus of discussion in this study is the creation of States, recognition and secession. 
Against this background lays the research question, ‘State creation: The legitimacy of 
unilateral secession and recognition in international law.’  
According to international law dictionary, a State is defined as;  
“An entity with a defined territory, with a population, under the control of its own 
government which engages in and has the capacity to engage in formal relations with 
other States”. 1  
The above definition follows a classical one  enshrined in Article 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 (Montevideo Convention) as 
possessing:
2
 a) permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity 
to enter into relations with other States.
3
 These criteria have been accepted as indicia 
requirements for statehood (declaratory theory) and have been passed into customary law.
4
 
In view of the foregoing, it has been established that the acquisition of statehood be 
determined by satisfying the criteria listed in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention.
5
 
Furthermore, Article 2 of the Montevideo Convention provides that ‘The federal State shall 
constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.’6 Drawing these two articles, it is 
evident that the Montevideo Convention forms the traditional foundation of statehood. 
In an effort to answer the research question, this study is centred on examining the 
concepts of statehood and secession. This analysis highlights the drawbacks associated with 
satisfying the traditional requirement of statehood and recognition by existing States.  
To test the theory on the creation of States and secession, this dissertation will apply 
the traditional concept of statehood and the notion of secession. Besides, the study will also 
assess the question against the theories of recognition (declaratory and constitutive) as these 
present a significant view to consider in any given factual situation of statehood.  
                                                          
1
 Boleslaw A Boczek International Law, A Dictionary (2005) 119. 
2
 DJ Harris Cases and Materials on International Law 6 ed (2004) 166. 
3
 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933. 
4
 TW Bennett & J Strug Introduction to International Law (2013) 57. 
5
 Hannah Woolaver ‘State failure, sovereign equality and non-intervention: Assessing claimed rights to 
intervene in failed States’ (2014) 32 Wisconsin International Law Journal 595 at 597. 
6
 Article 2 supra note 3. 
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Central to the research question is a case study of Somaliland’s unilateral secession 
and its declaration of independence. This includes an analysis of Somaliland satisfying the 
traditional requirements of statehood and its non-recognition by existing States. To a lesser 
extent, other examples such as Biafra, Eritrea, Katanga, Kosovo and South Sudan which form 
part of territorial entities that have attempted to or seceded from their parent States will also 
be examined.  
This dissertation will progress in five chapters as set out below. 
 
a) Structure of the dissertation 
 
Chapter I is an introductory of the thesis which outlines the focus of the study by setting out 
the research question, scope, purpose, significance, justification, structure  and problem 
statement of the study. 
Chapter II makes emphasis on early theoretical doctrines underpinning the process of 
State creation resulting into additional criteria and contemporary theories of recognition 
(constitutive and declaratory theories). The main aim of this chapter is to define the concept 
and traditional criteria of statehood in international law. This will be followed by recognition 
theories against which, hinges the Republic of Somaliland’s status in international law.  
The chapter will also establish the nexus between the statehood criteria and 
recognition requirements. The argument in this chapter favours the model of recognition and 
other additional criteria of statehood. It will be argued that in contemporary international law, 
an entity claiming statehood does not exist without being recognised by existing States. The 
objective against this background is that, while examining the critical issues on creation of 
States in international law, it is also imperative to review the normative requirement for an 
entity claiming to be a State. The modus operandi employed in this chapter is doctrinal law. 
This is because not only does the study examine the modern practice of State creation but 
also review the basic concept of statehood in international law. This approach is also 
significant in succeeding chapters.  
 Chapter III will describe the theories of secession followed by a brief overview and 
analysis of post-colonial successful and unsuccessful cases of unilateral secession. To a lesser 
extent, a comparison of the African to European international legal systems following the 
guidelines provided by the European Council (EC) with regards to recognition of new States 
in the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the recent break-up of the former 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) will be made.  
3 
    
 
Chapter IV which is central to this study will narrow down the focus to Somaliland 
and commence by providing a historical overview that led to the declaration of independence 
of and establish the facts surrounding Somaliland. Thereafter, Somaliland’s assertion and 
claim to statehood and its autonomous claims for independence will be reviewed. However, 
this act is viewed as incompatible with the principle of territorial integrity of States which 
protects the parent State of the independent-seeking entity. It will be argued that if it were 
accepted, would this mean that international law directly prohibits unilateral declarations of 
independence or only acceptance of such declarations by existing States?  
Nonetheless,  this chapter will implement the classical criteria of statehood; assess 
and analyse Somaliland’s qualification to be a ‘State’ and acknowledge that as a matter of 
fact, for Somaliland to be successful in its attempt at secession, the process of recognition 
within the existing international community is required. Particular attention will be paid to its 
non-recognition on the international plane, a fact precluding Somaliland from achieving its 
statehood. Conceivably, international practice does not support claims of statehood without 
recognition.  
Chapter V will draw summaries from the first four chapters and make conclusions.  
 
b) Problem statement 
 
In pursuit of self-determination, a number of entities have seceded or attempted to secede 
from their parent States and declared themselves as independent States. What is still unclear 
is whether international law supports declaration of new independent entities created through 
secession without the consent of the parent State or recognition of a new State by existing 
States is now a rule of customary international law.
7
 A question of debate arise as to when 
does an entity qualify to become a State in international law?
8
 Does it rest on the objective 
application of the rules of international law; is it upon recognition approach and acceptance 
of the claimant entity by existing States or; could it be admission to the United Nations (UN) 
or upon satisfying the traditional criteria of statehood? A definite answer to the question of 
statehood has however, been difficulty to provide and therefore, remain a matter of subject 
debate.  
                                                          
7
 Marcelo G Kohen ‘Introduction’ in Marcelo G. Kohen (ed) Secession: International Law Perspectives 
(2006) 3. 
8
 Martin Dixon Textbook of International Law 6 ed (2007) 115. 
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Usually, international law issues related to statehood arise from unusual political 
disorder such as a breakup of an existing State into several States, secession of a territory 
becoming into an independent State or merger of a State. However, circumstances evolving 
around emergence of new States, for example, those succeeding to the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia raised questions as to whether the traditional requirement of statehood under 
customary international law should be supplemented by additional criteria such as 
recognition and those denoted in the European Community (EC) Declaration on Yugoslavia 
and on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in the Eastern European and the Soviet 
Union.
9
   
The Republic of Somaliland is one such a territorial entity which declared itself an 
independent State. It is however, significant to note that over the past years, the Republic of 
Somaliland has slowly advanced its quest to achieve statehood. This is being pursued through 
momentum gain on its international relations with other existing States in the international 
community. However, the unending internal conflict that has gripped the parent State, the 
Republic of Somalia would possibly be among the reasons impeding Somaliland to becoming 
a State. 
Negotiations for a comprehensive peaceful disunion with the parent State have been 
on-going for more than two decades when Somaliland self-declared its independence amidst 
disintegration of the Republic of Somalia in 1991. Other neighbouring provinces of 
Somaliland such as Puntland also claimed their self-independence. The disintegration of 
Somalia was and continues to be a result of inter-ethnic violence within that State, rendering 
it to have an ineffective government and highly rated as a ‘failed State’.10 However, there 
have been major concerted efforts by the international community to bring peace and find 
solution for Somalia’s internal problems but chances to get a solution to the problems remain 
blurred. 
It is concluded that although self-declared as an independent State, the Republic of 
Somaliland remain internationally un-recognised as a State.
11
 Besides, recognition plays a 
major role in the creation of States, but it has not been passed as a rule of customary 
international law. Similarly, unilateral secession has not been favourably supported by 
international law.  
                                                          
9
 European Community (EC) Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States   
1992 (31) ILM 1482. 
10
 Woolaver op cit note 5 at 603 – 604. 
11
 Peggy Hoyle ‘Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?’  IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 8 no. 3 (2000) 
88. 
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c) Significance of the study 
 
The significance of choosing the study on the creation of States and unilateral secession is 
because States have remained the primary legal persons - subjects of international law 
capable of possessing international legal rights and duties which are obligatory in the 
international legal system.
12
  From academic perspective, the study fills up a gap created by a 
shortage of scholarly literature on creation of States focussing on Somaliland.  
As established in this study, while there is some literature on creation of States and 
unilateral secession in international law, there is not enough literature with a particular focus 
on Somaliland’s statehood. This thesis would contribute to the literature on creation of States 
in international law. 
 
d) Purpose of the study 
 
The objective of this study is to examine the legitimacy of unilateral secession as a method of 
State creation in international law. The main focus of assessment is Somaliland while an 
overview and brief assessment of successful and unsuccessful attempts at secession have also 
been employed.  
 
e)  Scope and limitation of the study  
 
The Republic of Somalia from which Somaliland seceded is rated as a failed State.  Issues 
related to failed States is not within the scope of this thesis. However, considering that the 
case study chosen exists within a failed State, reference to failed States will on a lesser extent 
be made.  
In addition, although recognition is viewed by some legal scholars as a political issue 
in creation of States, the underling political and economic issues that have a bearing on the 
status of Somaliland and the conflicts within the Republic of Somalia are not part of this 
study. The study solely focuses on the legal aspects of secession and creation of States in 
international law. 
  
                                                          
12
 Bennett & Strug op cit note 4 at 57; Harris op cit note 2 at 133. 
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f) Methodology 
 
In this study, a desk-based qualitative approach of research has been employed. Based on 
primary and secondary sources, an analysis of literature review will provide the conceptual 
legal framework for ensuing examination of the case study. The primary sources are case law, 
legal documents including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
Advisory Opinions. Secondary sources are books, journal articles, legal reports and other 
related online materials of new ideas and information. All these sources will be used in 
almost every part of this study.  
 
II. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has introduced the central research question by outlining key terms and 
identifying the legal background to the study. The research question centres on the legality of 
unilateral secession as a method of State creation in international law. Secession has little 
support in international law and its legality is still imprecise and remains as an unsettled issue 
in international law. 
Other than discussing the modules of the study, this chapter has identified the legal 
problems to be dealt with in this study; to be precise, the debate on whether international law 
supports unilateral secession and whether recognition of entities claiming statehood without 
the consent of the parent State from which they are seceding, is now part of customary law. 
This is based on the growing State practice in the international community. On the other 
hand, although recognition plays a major role in the creation of States, it has not yet been 
passed as a rule of customary international law. But drawing the current State practice, 
recognition will soon be passed into customary law.  
In addition, supplementary questions, significance and the objective have been 
introduced. Also set out in this chapter is an outline of the structure to be followed in this 
study.   
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CHAPTER II: THE CONCEPT OF STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
International law is generally viewed as a system governing relations among States
13
 and this 
chapter begins with the concept of statehood in contemporary international law. It further 
analyses the constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition.  
Despite the increasing number of international law actors, States have remained the 
primary and significant subjects of international law bearing capacity needed to exercise all 
the rights, powers and duties required in the international legal system.
14
 However, the 
emergence of many new States particularly through secession has been the major source of 
conflicts in the world; as such, State practice and international law have to some extent 
changed in nature.
 15
  
In the nineteenth century, no rules existed to determine what a State was as the matter 
was solely determined by the existing States in international law.
16
 However, the 
contemporary conception of statehood is drawn from the Peace of Westphalia established 
around 1648.
17
 During this period, State practice was represented in the Leizbniz’s 
Caesarinus where ‘sovereignty was redefined to mean a ruler’s power to command 
obedience, a certain minimum area of territory and actual military control of that area’;18 as a 
result, sovereignty became interrelated to territory, people and centralised government.
19
  
In the twentieth century, one of the major political developments is the emergence of 
territorial entities declaring independence as new States, a situation which is usually and 
persistently opposed by the State from which independence is being declared.
20
 While 
sometimes the creation of a new State ensued after declaration of independence by an entity, 
other times it did not.
21
 There are currently 193 United Nations (UN) Member States of 
                                                          
13
 Bennett & Strug op cit note 4 at 57. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 James Crawford The Creation of State in International Law 2 ed (2006) 4. 
16
 Ibid at 5. 
17
 Bennett & Strug op cit note 4 at 57. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Advisory Opinion, Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect 
of Kosovo 2010 ICJ Rep para 79; Crawford op cit note 15 at 4 
21
 Ibid Kosovo Advisory Opinion para 79. 
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which some have come into existence through secession - for example, Eritrea and South 
Sudan are the two successful African States that came as a result of consensual secession.
 22
 
Although the criteria for the creation of States are laid down by law, Crawford argues 
that, ‘… formation of a new State is … a matter of fact and not of law.23 He further states 
that, ‘… where a State actually exists, the legality of its creation or existence must be an 
abstract issue: the law must take account of the new situation, despite its illegality.’24 
Similarly, where a State does not exists, rules treating it as existing are purposeless and 
without authenticity because the criteria of statehood should be effective and not legitimacy.  
 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF STATEHOOD IN EARLY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The natural law and positivism are two main central approaches to international law. Since 
early seventh century, the question of statehood had continued to develop around 
international law.
25
 Crawford explains that Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf defined a 
State as ‘a complete association of free men’ joined together for the enjoyment of rights and 
for their common interests.
26
 However, Grotius’s definition was philosophical rather than 
legal because the naturalist philosophical argument entails that;  
‘The existence of States was taken for granted; the State, like the men who compose 
it, was automatically bound by the law of nations which was practically identical with 
the law of nature: outside of the sphere of the law of nature, which is also nations’.27  
Therefore, the existence of the population that composed a State were automatically 
bound by the law of nature which is frequently referred to as nations.
28
 However, natural law 
scholars argue that laws are derived from morality, religion or divine justice and universal 
principle and not from an authoritative opinion.
29
  
Contrary to Grotius’s definition, Francisco de Victoria gave a much more legal 
definition of a State. Victoria stated that, ‘A perfect State … is one which is complete in 
                                                          
22
 Connie de la Vega Dictionary of International Human Rights Law (2013) 149; United Nations Regional 
Information Centre for Western Europe ‘UN welcomes 193rd member state, available at 
http://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/26841-un-welcomes-193rd-member-state, accessed on 15 November 
2016. 
23
 Crawford op cit note 15 at 4; See also the formation in Willoghby, Nature of the State 195 where it is stated 
that Sovereignty upon which all legality depends, is itself a question of fact and not law’. 
24
 Ibid Crawford. 
25
 Ibid at 6. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid 
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itself, has its own laws and council …, such a State has … authority to declare war and no 
one else’.30 From a legal perspective at this point, Victoria brought in the renowned criteria of 
government and independence in view of entities that may declare war.
31
  
On the other hand, positivist theory is opposed to natural law theory. With positivist 
theory, Crawford affirms what Emmerich de Vattel argued that authority is what makes law, 
and that both the actual behaviour of States and the authorities are the foundation of law.
32
 
Every Nation which governs itself under whatever form, and which does not depend on any 
other nation is a sovereign State.’33 Therefore, the positivists tend to focus more on legal and 
illegal than morality ideas. The author asserts that positivist theory gained much support at 
the time. By the nineteenth century, positivism theory had received much support and became 
a more accepted theory than naturalist theory in international law.
34
  
 
III. THE CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
States are created in different ways; sometimes by armed struggle, revolution and rebellion, 
or by regrouping and unification.
35
 As established in the first chapter, the declaratory theory 
of statehood founded on the provisions described in the Montevideo Convention is the 
traditional criteria accepted in international law. These classical criteria are widely accepted 
as indicia of statehood and have been passed into customary law.
36
 Article 1 of the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 prescribes an objective and 
descriptive criteria for statehood that:- 
‘The State as a legal person of international law should possess the following qualifications:  
a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into 
relations with other States.’37  
The Montevideo Convention requirements received support from Opinion 1 of the 
Arbitration Commission of the European Conference which declared that,  
                                                          
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 S v Banda (1988) (4) SA 519 (B) at 523  
36
 Martin Dixon & Robert McCorqodale Cases and Materials of International Law 4 ed (2003) 133. 
37
 Article 1 supra note 3. 
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‘A State is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population 
which is subject to an organised political authority’ and that ‘such a State is characterised by 
political sovereignty’.38  
 
a) Permanent population 
 
A State is composed of not only a territory but also a discrete group of individuals.
39
 In 
determining the qualification of statehood against a claimed entity in international law, courts 
have applied permanent population as a criterion that: 
‘The jurisdiction of States within the limits of national territory applies to all the 
inhabitants. Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the 
national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive 
than those of the nationals.’40 
For an entity to qualify as a State, the doctrine of international legal system does not 
necessarily require a minimum and fixed number of the inhabitants.
 41
 It is assumed that the 
theory of permanent population as a criterion is not static. In the Western Sahara Case, the 
court found that the population of Western Sahara consisted of nomads who travel across the 
desert without regard to boundaries. The court held that nomadic people did have certain 
rights with regards to the land they traversed.
42
  
It also follows that while India has an estimated population of over a billion within its 
territorial borders, micro States such as the Vatican City, Nauru and Seychelles which have 
small populations of approximately 768, 10 000 and 12 000 respectively, are recognised 
States.
43
 Despite the inequality in population figure, States possess the same equal voting on 
the international plane. Additional, States enjoy sovereign equality in the international 
community irrespective of their internal character.
44
  
In addition, international law takes into account persons who are found habitually 
residents of a new State and they automatically acquire the nationality of the new State and 
relinquish their former.
45
 However, this is another subject to rights in the new State to restrict 
                                                          
38
 European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States 31 
ILM (1992) 1485. 
39
 Dixon op cit note 8 at 115. 
40
 Article 9 of the Montevideo Convention. 
41
 Dixon & McCorquodale op cit note 36 at 136. 
42
 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 1975 ICJ Rep 12 ILR at 59. 
43
 Crawford op cit note 15 at 52; Harris op cit note 2 at 100; John Dugard SC International Law: A South 
African Perspective 4 ed (2011) 83. 
44
 Article 2 of the United Nations Charter; Woolaver op cit note 5 at 597. 
45
 Ibid. 
11 
    
 
who may be its nationals.
46
 For example, in the Case Concerning Acquisition of Polish 
Nationality, the Permanent Count of International Justice (PCIJ) held that:  
‘.. the Minority Treaties in general and the Polish Treaties in particular have been 
concluded with new States or with States which, as a result of war, have had their 
territories considered enlarged and whose population was not therefore clearly 
defined from the stand point of political allegiance.
47
  
Therefore, the population which was initially not a permanent population of a territory 
becomes a population or although not physically present on the territory, nationals who are 
abroad are regarded as a population of that particular territory. Certainly, the issue of 
permanent population is not viewed as an obstacle to satisfying the criterion of permanent 
population. 
 
b) Defined territory 
 
An entity claiming statehood should have a defined territory with physical existence that 
marks it out from its neighbours. In determining cases of statehood in international law, the 
criterion of ‘defined territory’ as laid down in the Montevideo Convention has been applied 
by courts.  A defined territory should mean that there exists an agreed border with the 
claimant State’s neighbours.  
However, there are a number of disputed borders among States over the precise 
demarcation but even if the entity's territorial boundaries are not precisely demarcated, or are 
to some extent in dispute, the requirement of territory remain satisfied.
48
 For example, India 
and Pakistan have had their borders disputed over Jammu-Kashmir since independence but 
their statehood has not been affected;
49
  Israel has continued its territorial claim over 
Palestine but was admitted to the United Nations (UN) and her statehood status has remained 
unaffected.
50
 Therefore, what matters is a consistent band of territory which is undeniably 
within a certain area controlled by the purported State.
51
 This is because recognition of a 
State remains even though borders with its neighbours are uncertain. In the Deutsche 
Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish State, the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal said 
that;  
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‘In order to say that a State exists and can be recognised as such … it is enough that 
… its territory has a sufficient consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet 
been accurately delimited.’
 52
  
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the court held that,  
‘There is for instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited 
and defined, and often in various places and for long periods they are not, as is shown 
by the case of the entry of Albania into the League of Nations.’ 53  
Equally in the Island of Palmas Case, the dispute over sovereignty on the Islands of 
Palmas was brought for arbitration to determine whether the Island of Palmas in its entirety 
forms a part of Netherlands territory or of territory belonging to the United States of America. 
In his observation, Judge Max Huber said that, ‘Sovereignty in relation to the portion of the 
surface of the globe is the legal condition necessary for the inclusion of such portion in the 
territory of any particular State.’54   
 
c) Government  
 
In order to occupy a position as a State in international law, an entity claiming statehood must 
have a government whose core responsibilities are international rights and duties of a State, 
self-governing or independent of any other power.
55
 The government should be ‘effective and 
functional’, exercising internal and external independence; and effective power over the 
permanent population and the territory it claims sovereignty.
56
 Internal and external 
governance should be displayed by the claimant entity through exhibiting capability of 
maintaining legal order and rule internally and; act unilaterally without the support of 
external actors.
57
  
With the exception of law and maintenance of order as well as creation of institutions, 
international law has no specific requirement as to the nature and degree of general control.
58
 
Although there is a distinction of governments from their States in international law, it is only 
the government of that State which can enter into treaties with other legal persons of 
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international law.
 59
  Lack of a coherent and functional government may negate a State from 
carrying out international relations with other States which should in principle render a State 
to lose its personality. But Brownlie correctly argued that once a State has been established, 
widespread civil strife or the disintegration of order through foreign invasion or acts of God 
are not considered to affect legal personality.
60
 This leaves a debate of independence and 
representation to be discussed below.  
 
d) Capacity to enter into relations with other States 
 
The fourth requirement of statehood is ‘capacity to enter into relations with other states’.61 In 
contemporary international law theories, ‘capacity to enter into relations with other States’ 
has normally resulted into difficulties to attaining statehood’. This is because this criterion is 
not constant but dependent on the attitude of existing States in the international community.
 62
 
Primarily, ‘capacity to enter into relations with other States’ should denote that an entity is 
capable of bearing legal and factual authority and act as an independent State without 
referring to any other State.
63
 In the Austro-German Customs Union Case,
64
 the PCIJ defined 
‘capacity to enter into relations with other States’ as: 
‘the sole right of decision in all matters economic, political, financial or other with 
the result that independence is violated, as soon as there is any violation thereof, 
either in the economic, political, or any other field, these different aspects of 
independence being in practice one and indivisible’65  
Certainly, this fourth requirement signifies independence because a territory cannot be 
considered as a State if it is under the direct or indirect control of another State. The 
definition of independence is founded on the Austro-German Customs Union Case where a 
dispute upon which the ICJ was asked to give its opinion. This was in relation to the 
applicability of the provisions of Article 88 of the Geneva Protocol
66
 as to whether the 
proposed custom union between Austria and German was consistency with obligations of 
Austria under the Treaty of Saint Germain and the Geneva Protocol. The PCIJ advised that; 
67
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‘ … . Independence as thus understood is really no more than the normal condition of 
States according to international law; it may also be  described as sovereignty 
(suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant that the State has over 
it no other authority than that of international law’.
68
   
However, this meaning is presently considered more restrictive because the growing 
inter-dependence of States would become a barrier to most of the new emergence States in 
achieving the status of statehood in international law.
69
 In his dissenting opinion, Judge 
Anzililotti proposed another test of independence; whether the entity in question was legally 
dependant on another in terms of which it was subject to the will of another.
70
  
 The notion of independence can be said to be impractical in terms of financial aid and 
political support as there is no State which does not depend on other States in the 
international community.
71
 It is argued that this requirement is of ‘legal independence’ and 
not ‘factual autonomy’ which means that a State exists when not under the lawful sovereignty 
of any other State. 
 
IV. ADDITIONAL CRITERIA OF STATEHOOD 
 
As the laid down Montevideo criteria for statehood have become non-exhaustive, some other 
criteria of statehood in contemporary international law have been suggested. Crawford 
suggested other determinants of statehood which are; permanence, willingness and ability to 
observe international law; a certain degree of civilisation and legal order.
72
 Furthermore, 
when applying for membership to the United Nations (UN), an entity should accept to uphold 
the principles of the UN Charter, the most significant of which are non-use of force, respect 
of fundamental rights and adherence to a democratic form of government.
 73
  
It is evident that acceptance in the international community by other States, satisfying 
the new criteria as suggested by legal scholars and compliance with the purpose and 
principles of the UN Charter form authoritative criteria to be satisfied by an entity claiming 
statehood. These are only suggested criteria and therefore, are illegitimate. Although they 
continue to receive support on the international plane, it is submitted that more time is 
required to develop these suggested criteria.  
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Significant to note in contemporary international law is the interplay of other factors 
revolving around human rights and self-determination. These have been advocated for that 
for an entity to claim statehood; it should satisfy the standards and expectations of the 
international community in line with these issues.
74
 This expansion received support from the 
Guidelines on Union drawn-out by the European Community (EC) in 1991.
75
 It also extended 
to Yugoslavia which required recognition of States to be dependent on compliance with 
norms of international law relating to self-determination, respect for human rights and the 
protection of minorities.
76
  
From a legal point of view, the added legal criteria are illegitimate because they have 
not yet been passed into customary law and there is still less support both among legal 
scholars and State practice. These divided views have developed into a greater debate on 
recognition and the creation of States in international law. 
 
V. RECOGNITION OF STATES – THE GREAT DEBATE IN CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
  
Regardless of the general perception, the attitude of existing States play a major role in legal 
arguments related to statehood in contemporary international law. It is to be understood that 
for an entity to become a State, it requires more than just a declaration of independence by a 
new State but existing States have to acknowledge its status.
77
  This is done through an act of 
recognition. 
Recognition signifies a State’s response to certain factual situations which is a formal 
notice taken of new States or governments, a declaration that rebellious groups are 
belligerents or revolutionaries, grant of diplomatic or representative status to particular 
persons and the acknowledgement of changes of sovereignty over territories.
78
 The 
legitimacy of recognition is to create an estopel which means that the recognising State is 
bound by its act of recognition.
79
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Whether creation of a new State is dependent on or independent of recognition by 
existing States or should an entity be considered a State under international law despite the 
fact of not being recognised by the existing State, remains a debatable legal question of 
contemporary international law.
80
  
Although normally influenced by political reasons, recognition by existing States has 
considerably factored as a great debate on the creation of States in international law.
81
 The 
debate is centred on the two different schools of thoughts which are the constitutive and 
declaratory theories. The reasons found difficult to resolve the argument over State 
recognition theory is that political opinions are often transformed into legal questions to be 
addressed in international legal system.
82
  
But States are free to adjust to political changes and have no obligation to recognise 
an entity that has fulfilled the objective criteria of statehood. However, State practice has not 
supported this attitude.
83
 On the contrary, States are obliged to desist from recognising 
situations arising from the breach of international law.
84
 This obligation has not yet been 
established in customary law because the obligation is generally not drawn from a subjective 
logic of opinion iuris but reasonably from resolutions by organs such as the UN Security 
Council (SC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
85
  
On the other hand, claims of admission to the UN membership constitute existence of 
a State and consequences of constitutive and declaratory theory debates arise. This is due to 
arbitrary and subjective individual State decisions by individual UN Member States decision 
is superseded by which collective decision of the UN members States.  In other instances, a 
new State may be prematurely recognised before all the factual criteria for recognising an 
entity as a State have been fulfilled. While the parent State may consider recognition as an 
aggressive political act, a new entity will find it a welcome method of international 
protection.
86
 
 
In Africa, recognition as a factor has been demonstrated in the failure of declared 
independent entities such as the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC 
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States). It followed that South Africa, although through its legislature granted independence 
to TBVC States in 1976, the United Nations called upon all its member States not to 
recognise the TBVC States. This was on account that other than South Africa, these States 
were not recognised by any other State in the international community.
87
 In Europe, the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) remains in a legal state of limbo as its 
statehood has not been achieved due to non-recognition.  
 
VI. RECOGNITION THEORIES  
 
According to recognition theory, the rights and duties relating to statehood are based on 
recognition by existing States. During the eighteenth century, States existed and was assumed 
to be founded on its internal sovereignty and did not require recognition from existing 
States.
88
  
Kreijen argued that, ‘recognition ultimately enables a political community to accept 
the rights and obligations established by international law but the community concerned 
decides the extent it would bind itself.
89
 In Kreijen’s view, recognition served as a means of 
exclusion during the colonial period whilst in contemporary international law, recognition is 
principally a means of inclusion of an entity in the international community, guaranteeing the 
new State with equal rights and obligations of a sovereign State.
 90
 
Nonetheless, the tension between concepts of recognition being a legal act in 
international law and assumptions in the political domain that recognition is a matter of 
choice continue to exist. Brownlie is correct when he argued that the political act of 
recognition is the pre-condition to achieving international legal personality; that in its 
extreme form, the legal personality of a State is hang on political consent and recognition by 
existing States.
 91
 As a matter of principle, the effect is impossible to accept. Certainly, States 
on their own cannot separate judgement or establish any competence of other States which is 
recognised by international law and independent of an agreement.
92
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Two grounds of recognition theory are found; whether the new State exists before 
recognition by existing States and secondly, the degree of discretion that States have to grant 
or withhold recognition.
93
 Shaw argued that, ‘the decision whether to recognise or not is 
generally dependent upon political views rather than legal grounds’.94 According to Shaw’s 
definition, recognition is a ‘statement by an international legal person as to the status in 
international law of another real or alleged international legal person or of the validity of a 
particular factual situation’.95  
It is evident that determining a subject of international law becomes more significant 
because contentious issues arise. In S v Banda Friedman J said that,  
‘The constitutive theory, founded on recognition, contains variables which are rooted 
in political, ideological and economic motives which cannot, in law, serve as a basis 
for determining the existence of a legal entity.’96  
So, once recognition occurs, applicable international legal consequences which constitute 
‘participation in the international legal process ....’ follows.97 But rather than expressing 
views, a system to determine a State in international law must be established to resolve 
contentious issues 
 
a) The constitutive theory  
 
According to this theory, the rights and duties relating to statehood are based on recognition 
by existing States and that an entity claiming statehood becomes a State - a subject of 
international law through recognition.
 98
 This approach is founded on the shift from natural 
law to positivist theory of international law doctrine which is centred on consent as an 
essential element of State creation.
99
 Recognition bears constitutive effect because it is a 
necessary pre-condition for the establishment of the State concerned.
100
 The strict constitutive 
position was adopted by Oppenheim and other positivists who expressed that:  
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‘The formation of a new State is … a matter of fact, and not of law. …as soon as 
recognition is given, the new State’s territory is recognised as the territory of a 
subject of international law, and it matters not how this territory is acquired before 
recognition.
101
 
A further persuasive expression is by Lauterpacht who argued that,  
‘The full international personality of raising communities … cannot be automatic … 
as is ascertainment requires the prior determination of difficulty circumstances of fact 
and law, there must be someone to perform that task. In the absence of the preferred 
solution … the latter must be fulfilled by States already existing.’102 
While Lauterpacht stated that recognition is constitutive,
103
 Brownlie argued that 
‘recognition is an optional and political act will of a State.104 According to Crawford’s 
explanation, Lauterpacht’s argument is that two orthodox of constitutive theory are 
distinguished. Prior to recognition, the community in question has no rights and obligation as 
subjects of international law; and that recognition is entirely at political discretion and not a 
legal duty owed to the community.
105
  
The substantial element of the constitutive view is subjective to what is in accordance 
with the recognising State's interests.
106
 Under international law, rights are not dependent 
upon recognition of the right-holder by the other individual; an entity is recognised because it 
is a State.
107
 Recognition is therefore, only an acceptance, a response to, an acquiescence of 
what already exists.
108
 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law concisely brings it out that 
‘an entity that satisfies the requirements of the definition of a State is a State whether or not 
its statehood is formally recognised by other States.’109  
However, some scholars have argued that the act of recognition, although maybe centred 
on legal criteria, recognition is influenced by political, economic and legal consideration.
110
 
For example, even though Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) is a member 
of the African Union, Morocco declined to recognise that State because it has a claim of that 
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territory.
111
 The same situation is more prominent particularly when there is a civil war in an 
existing State.
112
  
Besides, while Brownlie argues that recognition can be viewed as constitutive for the 
recognised State because it is a condition for creation of formal diplomatic relations with the 
new State,
113
 Shaw argues that the act of recognition is lawfully constitutive because rights 
and obligations of States do not automatically result from recognition.
114
 He further argued 
that, even if an entity claiming statehood is non-recognised, this would not amount to a 
conclusive argument against its statehood.
115
 It is argued that, where the recognising 
government is not acting in an opportunistic manner, recognition is authoritative evidence of 
legal status.
116
 
The constitutive theory has some degree of implicit support by State practice. However, 
there is necessarily no evidence of customary international law because the logic tends to be 
difficulty to explain as other scholars have expressed their explanations for opinio juris.
117
 
States misinterpret circumstances and may cause unintended significances.  Kreijen correctly 
concluded that ‘since the act of recognition is alleged as generating a distinct legal effect 
which is creation of a State, it is a legitimate act.’118  
 
b) The declaratory theory  
 
Contrary to the constitutive theory, the declaratory theory of recognition is conventionally 
founded on Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention which provides: ‘The political existence 
of the State is independent of recognition by other States.’119 The initial decision to recognise 
a State in objective reality appears to have been designed on this test.
120
 Oppenheim shares 
his views when he explains the relation between the concept of statehood and recognition. He 
said; 
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 ‘… Statehood itself is independent of recognition. International law does not say that 
a State is not in existence as long as it is not recognised, but it takes no notice of it 
before its recognition....
121
  
Crawford correctly espouses this foundation when he states that recognition of a new 
State is a political act. But according to Shaw’s analysis, recognition is simply an acceptance 
by States of an already existing situation.
 122
 Therefore, according to the declaratory theory, 
the creation of a new State is factual in that,  
‘a State exists as a subject of international law - as a subject of international rights 
and duties - as soon as it ‘exists’ as a fact, that is, as soon as it fulfils the conditions of 
statehood as laid down in international law. Recognition merely declares the 
existence of that fact.
123  
Supporter of this approach is Kreijen who argues that, ‘recognition serves as an 
official act of acknowledgment of a factual situation and thus is of a declaratory nature 
only.’124 At this point, recognition could be rendered immaterial because the basis of 
statehood is rather factual than individual State option. Therefore, recognition should be 
automatic based on specified principal criteria.
125
 
Although there is much support of the declaratory theory by modern scholars as well 
as arbitral practice, particularly the Tinoco Arbitration which suggests that recognition is 
simply evidence that the international law requirement are met, State practice does not 
because international rights on the international plane are not acquired automatically but are 
acquired after States are recognised.
126
 Worster criticised this theory when he argues that the 
fact that recognition confers recognised States with rights alters States expectations and may 
adopt choices that would result into peace.
127
 Worster is correct when he criticised this theory 
because existing States would not recognise a new State which would ruin the peaceful 
prevailing atmosphere of any State.  
Recognition may however be unilaterally expressed or implied and/or collectively 
made by existing States 
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c) Methods of recognition  
 
i) Unilateral express or implied  recognition 
 
Unilateral recognition entails that an existing State recognises an entity claiming to be a State 
and that it satisfies the factual statehood requirement bearing the rights and duties of a State 
in international law.
128
 State practice has shown that States are at liberty of adjusting to 
prevailing circumstances around them;
129
 recognition is a matter of intention either by 
express or implied.
130
  
Express recognition is when an existing State issues an official statement recognising an 
entity claiming statehood.
131
 For example, the government of the United Kingdom in 1950 
expressed recognition of Israel as a sovereign State by declaring that, ‘His Majesty's 
Government have decided to accord de jure recognition to the State of Israel.’132   
On the other hand, implied recognition is when an existing State performs certain 
conducts such as establishing diplomatic offices, hosting of and sending diplomatic 
representatives to an entity claiming statehood, acknowledging a flag or concluding treaties 
with an entity claiming statehood.
133
  
Dugard argued that while recognition maybe indirect through exchange of diplomats, it 
should not be inferred from an exchange of consular proxies or the fact that the States are 
parties to multilateral treaties or being members of the same organisation.
134
 For instance, the 
United Kingdom tacitly established diplomatic relations with Namibia in 1990 but did not 
accord Namibia formal recognition of statehood.
135
 Under international law, conducting 
relations with a particular entity may be considered as recognition of that entity as a State. 
However, specific circumstances under which such relations are conducted must 
comprehensively and clearly be examined. 
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ii) Collective recognition  
 
Although contentious and unclear, collective recognition is another form of recognition. This 
recognition may take the form of a joint declaration by a group of States
136
 or when a group 
of existing States – for example, the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) or the 
United Nations (UN) directly infers recognition of the existence of a new State by an act of 
recognition or indirectly through admission of the new State to the organisation.
137
  
Contention arises on whether admission to the UN constitutes recognition. Admission 
to UN membership is prima facie evidence of statehood and member States not recognising 
the new State risk their membership by disregarding the fundamental rights of the new 
existing State.
138
 The UN Charter identifies two categories of members – the original and 
subsequent new members. Article 3 of the UN Charter provides:  
‘The original Members of the United Nations shall be the States … or having 
previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the 
present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.’139 
Subsequent membership is provided in Article 4 of the UN Charter:  
‘1. Membership in the United Nations is open to other peace-loving States which 
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter ….140 
2. The admission of any such State to membership in the Nations will be effected by a 
decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security 
Council.’141 
Although membership to the UN is limited to States only (according to the wording of 
Articles 3 and 4 of the UN Charter), the numerous reference to ‘States’ in the two articles is 
an indication that the rights and obligations protected in the UN Charter are connected to 
statehood.
142
 In contemporary international order, since the Charter affirmed self-
determination of people
143
 which has become a principle of significance, some of the 
requirements of statehood for the purpose of admission to the United Nations have become 
flexible.
144
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There are currently 193 member States of the United Nations
145
 and its only Israel whose 
statehood is still denied by some Arab nations. The UN organs have dependably assumed that 
Israel is protected by the Charter principles on the use of force against her Arab 
neighbours.
146
 However, all UN member States are accepted as States despite the fact that 
several of them could not have received wide recognition by other States had the ball been 
left in the courts of other States to determine their statehood.
147
  
Against this background, admission to the UN does not constitute recognition as such and 
cannot alone provide a definite answer to the question of statehood in international law. This 
is because while some entities have been admitted to the UN membership, they are not 
recognised as States – for instance Zanzibar and Palestine (although this poses different 
statuses).  
Not until 2002 was Switzerland a UN Member State despite having been recognised by 
majority of the international community many years ago. Certainly, Switzerland was a State 
before its admission to UN membership. Moreover, nothing in customary law or the Charter 
itself requires a non-recognising State to give ‘political’ recognition and to enter into 
relations with another member.
148
 
 
iii)  Collective non-recognition 
 
Non-recognition was founded on the doctrine of ex injuria jus non oritu uis.
149
 The doctrine 
originated from Manchukuo’s non-recognition as a State. Manchuria, a Chinese province was 
invaded by the Japanese in 1932 and established Manchukuo which was declared a State.
150
 
Stimson, the Secretary of States declared that the United States of America will not recognise 
any treaty entered into between China and Japan that damaged Chinese’s territorial 
sovereignty and integrity.
151
  Manchukuo’s declaration as a sovereign State is viewed 
unsuccessful. This is evidenced in the League of Nations’ Assembly’s passing of a resolution 
calling upon its Member States not to recognise Manchukuo.
152
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The failed declared independent entities of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei 
(TBVC States) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to successfully achieve 
their statehood is as a result of non-recognition. Rudrakumaran also argued that, the Soviet 
governments in the Baltic States were illegitimate puppet regimes and the collective non-
recognition events surrounding the Japanese occupation and control of Manchuria is 
constitutive theory approach.
153
 This is demonstrated if a claimed State is excluded from the 
international plane by most States. The claimed State might be unable to assert its legal 
personality, such that it is rendered unsuccessful and non-independent.
154
  
According to Lauterpacht, ‘non-recognition is based on assumption that acts contrary 
to international law are unacceptable and cannot become a source of legal rights for the 
wrong doer.
155
 That assumption applies to international law as one of the ‘general principles 
of law recognised by civilised nations.
156
 
 The concept that there were peremptory norms (jus cogens) of international law was 
new when the doctrine of non-recognition was first developed.
157
 In today’s contemporary 
international law, it is accepted that certain peremptory norms are founded on which under no 
circumstance derogation is permitted.
158
 Contemporary international law acknowledges 
development of this doctrine in that violation of a norm of jus cogen is illegal and position is 
applicable to the creation of States.
159
 In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ stated that, 
‘States are no under a duty to recognise such acts under customary international law and in 
accordance with the general principles of law.
160
 It is evident that the resolution passed by the 
League of Nations Assembly in Manchukuo’s case, or resolutions by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) confirms the already existing duty of States not to recognise such 
acts in international law.
161
  
 Moreover, the International Law Commission validated the doctrine of non-
recognition in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(DARS).
162
 Articles 40 and 41 of DARS provide that, ‘… no State shall recognise as lawful a 
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situation created by a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of 
general international law’.163  
For purposes of non-recognition, peremptory norms recognised by the United Nations 
are prohibition on aggression (Iraqi’s invention of Kuwait in 1990); the acquisition of 
territory by use of force (Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in 1980 
and 1981); systematic racial discrimination and the suppression of human rights (Rhodesia 
and the Bantustan) and the denial of self-determination (Katanga, Namibia and the 
Bantustan).
164
 
 An example of collective non-recognition is the South African’s Bantustan entities of 
(TBVC).
165
 When the Bantustan entities declared independence in 1976, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations condemned the establishment of Bophuthatswana as a State 
and called upon its Member States not to recognise the independence of TBVC entities as 
States.
166
 The General Assembly’s reasoning was that these entities violated several 
peremptory norms in the field of self-determination and human rights.
167
 
 Taking into consideration the United Nations’ victories in administering non-
recognition by condemning unilateral declared independent States such as Rhodesia, the 
TBVC and the TRNC through resolutions, could be understood as a success of the 
organisation and its Member States; as such, it is assumed that this practice will soon be 
turned into customary law.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the doctrine of statehood in early international law 
and how it has developed in contemporary international law. It has demonstrated that the 
concept of statehood is a contentious issue which is still far from being settled in international 
law. Satisfying the Montevideo criteria does not guarantee entity recognition as a State and 
neither does failure to satisfy the Montevideo criteria preclude an entity from achieving 
statehood.  
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Although the creation of States has foundation on the Montevideo criteria, the laid 
down criteria are now non-exhaustive as other criteria have been suggested. However, the 
suggested criteria are illegitimate and need more time to develop. Neither the constitutive 
theory nor declaratory theory of recognition substantively fulfils contemporary practice in 
international law. However, Simson’s doctrine has enduring effects in modern international 
law. The two examples of Manchukuo and the TRNC reveal that the constitutive theory is the 
most preferred theory regarding the international legal effect of recognition in contemporary 
State practice. Therefore, the constitutive theory is the correct approach to creation of States. 
This is because not until an entity has been recognised as such by other States, a State does 
not exist in international law. Lauterpacht rightly asserted;  
‘it is not an automatic test of factual existence, but only recognition by other States ..., 
that can answer the question of the legal existence of a State as a subject of 
international law’.168  
It is concluded that while the declaration theory is supported by case law, treaties as 
well as contemporary legal scholars, State practice support the constitutive theory. Since 
customary rules are founded on State practice, the constitutive theory of recognition will soon 
be passed into customary law.  
In the next chapter, I will analyse the theory of secession and examples of successful 
and unsuccessful attempts at secession will be analysed. 
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CHAPTER III: SECESSION, SELF-DETERMINATIN AND STATEHOOD 
 
I. INTRODUCTION   
 
Beyond the colonial context, the creation of new States and secession are among the most 
significant in international law. The notion of secession is intertwined with the right of self-
determination and these two concepts are normally discussed alongside each other.  
Secession is one of the methods on which States are created.
169
 In relation to self-
determination, secession has until recently been the most common conspicuous mode of 
creation of States in contemporary international law and remains a controversial issue.
170
 
Numerous attempts at secession are still disputed if not unsuccessful – for example the failed 
secession attempts in Chechnya, the Republika Srpska, Katanga, Biafra and Somaliland are 
not isolated cases still under contention.
171
  Other unsuccessful attempts at unilateral 
secession include Tibet’s attempted secession from China, Bougainville’s attempted 
secession from Papua New Guinea, Kashmir’s attempted separation from India, both 
Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s secession attempts from Georgia.172  
Unilateral secession has also remained as an object of disagreement among legal 
scholars. While some legal scholars interpret secession narrowly, others take a broader view 
of its definition. A case could be narrowly considered as secession whereas the same case in a 
broader way may be regarded as dissolution.
173
 This lack of uniformity in definition has 
significant consequences.  
According to  Dahlitz’s suggestion,  
‘the issue of secession arises whenever a significant proportion of the population of a 
given territory, being part of a State expresses the wish by word or by deed to become 
a sovereign State in itself, or to join with and become part of another sovereign 
State.’174  
Against this backdrop, some legal scholars view secession as an illegal action in that 
the act violates territorial integrity of an existing State. According to Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that the illegality of secession is only 
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present when there is violation of a fundamental norm of international law, in particular that 
of a peremptory character (jus cogens).
175
 Territorial integrity of States is a norm of jus 
cogens and the unilateral character of a declaration of independence alone does not bring 
secession within the scope of illegality when consent from the parent State exists.
176
 While 
Crawford submits that secession is ‘the creation of a State by the use or threat to use force 
without the consent of the former sovereign’, 177 Kohen asserts that secession is;  
‘… the creation of a new independent entity through the separation of a part of the 
territory and population of an existing State without the consent of the latter. ... in 
order to be incorporated as part of another State’.178 
Owing to consent requirement from the parent State, Dahlitz argues that secession 
becomes complex when there is opposition by the parent State and such objections play a 
fundamental role because the parent State has a right to respect of its territorial integrity.
179
 In 
cases such as Eritrea, Montenegro, Singapore, South Sudan and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) where secession has been successful, parent States waived their rights and 
permitted secession by consent.
180
  
Under international law, entities such as Somaliland, although unilaterally seceded 
outside the context of colonialism, as long as the parent State, Somalia does not renounce its 
right to respect of its territorial integrity, Somaliland had no right to unilaterally secede and 
become a State.
181
 As it was also confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the 
Quebec case, the right of self-determination outside colonialism does not equal a right to 
independence.
182
 
 
a) Defining Secession 
 
According to Crawford, secession is ‘the process by which a particular group seeks to 
separate itself from the State to which it belongs and to create a new State’.183 The most cited 
example on secession, Reference re Secession of Quebec in the Canadian Supreme Court 
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(SCC) defined the concept as follows: ‘When a people is blocked from the meaningful 
exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it 
by secession.’184 However, the court underscored that ‘it remains unclear whether this ... 
proposition actually reflects an established international law standard.
185
 It is evident from the 
court’s ruling that the issue of secession was not resolved. While some legal scholars have 
argued in favour of secession, many have admitted that secession is not established in 
international law. However, there is also no rule of international law prohibiting unilateral 
secession.
186
 In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the ICJ stated that; 
‘In many cases, territorial integrity has been a significant restriction and since 1945, 
the international community has been hesitant to accept unilateral secession of 
territorial units if the secession is opposed by an existing State from which an entity is 
seceding.
187
  
Crawford concluded that, since 1945, no State which has been created by unilateral 
secession has been admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes of the 
Predecessor State.
188
 However, the general unanimity regarding self-determination is that 
secession in and of itself is ‘neither legal nor illegal’ in international law, but a legally neutral 
act, the consequences of which are regulated internationally’.189  
 
b) Unilateral secession and international law 
 
A number of constituent entities have successfully or unsuccessfully seceded from their 
parent States in pursuit of exercising their right of self-determination. For example, 
Somaliland seceded from Somalia; South Sudan seceded from Sudan while Eritrea seceded 
from Ethiopia. In all these cases, the entities declared themselves as sovereign independent 
States at different intervals.  
Generally, unilateral secession is secession without negotiation …. 190 International 
law neither grant component territorial entities a right to secede from their parent States nor 
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prohibit secession.
191
 In the nineteenth century legal scholars assumed that international law 
neither clearly prohibits nor recognises the right of an ethnic group to unilaterally secede 
from a parent State.
192
 In the Kosovo’s Advisory Opinion, the ICJ decided that unilateral 
declarations of secession are not by themselves unlawful under international law.
193
 The UN 
Charter affords a mechanism that enables a legal violation of the territorial integrity of a 
certain State. It does however not make reference to territorial integrity of States in 
circumstance of attempts at secession.
194
  
A reference to attempts at secession seems to be founded in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law. In the legal framework of the right of self-determination, the 
Declaration provides for an exception to protection of territorial integrity which is the right to 
internal self-determination and provides: 
‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity … sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples … representing 
the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour.’195  
Subsequently, in the Quebec case, the SCC held that the right of colonial peoples to 
external self-determination is undisputed. The court concluded that;  
‘the international law right to self-determination only generates at best, a right to 
external self-determination in situations of former colonies; where a people is 
oppressed … or where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government 
to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development’.196  
In the context of the general finding, the court observed that under international law, 
no right of unilateral secession was available.
197
 The emergence of a new State disrupts the 
territorial integrity of its parent State. It could be construed as being creative of an obligation 
to withhold recognition of an entity seeking unilateral secession because in some 
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circumstances, States are obliged to withhold recognition
. 198
 However, Cassese argues that, 
while majority of scholar’s view have divergent and objective views to secession; secession 
'is a fact of life, outside the realm of law’.199 Outside the concept of decolonisation, the fact 
that secession cannot be achieved without having effects on territorial integrity which is an 
issue of international law, then secession is not a fact of life but law. 
 
c) Secession and State practice 
 
State practice confirms that the unilateral character of secession does not make a declaration 
of independence illegal. This was confirmed in the Quebec case where the SCC argued that a 
new State could emerge unilaterally but the definitive success of State creation would depend 
on international recognition. Furthermore, the court stated that foreign States would so 
consider the legality and legitimacy of the claim to independence.
200
 
In contemporary international law, East Pakistan in its quest to exercising self-
determination successfully seceded and declared independence from Pakistan in 1971.
201
 It is 
argued that there were unusual factual circumstances that prompted this secession; as such, it 
was considered as a last resort.
202
 Outside the colonial context, secession has been rare and 
State practice is particularly reluctant to recognise unilateral secession entities.
203
 This is 
because some legal scholars observe the concept as irrelevant to people entitled to self-
determination in post-colonial era.
204
 Koskenniemi argued that ‘secession was compliance, 
and opposing rupture of old colonial State was unlawful’.205  
However, in many cases, hitches arise when it has been identified that minorities of an 
entity are entitled to self-determination which may entail a right to unilateral secession. The 
UN has also supported secession only in cases where colonial authorities have threatened the 
right of self-determination.
206
 Even so, the UN has in some cases declined to endorse claims 
of secession. For example, despite reports of serious violations of human rights against 
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Biafrans, the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) rejected Biafra’s claim for 
independence in 1967; confirmation is contained in the UN Secretary-General U Thant’s 
statement that, ‘the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept ... the principle of 
secession of a part of its Member State.’207  
In post-colonial era, Bangladesh was the first to successfully secede from Pakistan. 
But even so, Bangladesh was not admitted to the UN until Pakistan gave formal recognition 
to the State of Bangladesh some years after it was first recognised by other States.
208
 The 
reason could probably be that entitlement of the right of self-determination or secession 
would compromise the ‘sovereign equality’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of existing members.209 
Even in cases where secession was prompted by serious human rights violations by any State, 
the international community has favoured the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
parent State.
210
 This could also be explained that the significance of territorial integrity has 
taken precedence. 
While Crawford argued that ‘the wealth of State practice in the context of 
decolonisation demonstrating that the exercise of self-determination has in practice always 
taken place through agreement with the parent State,’211 Foster argued that ‘self-
determination has been in the first instance a right to which the colonial authority must give 
effect’.212 However, severe denial of a people’s fundamental human rights of self-
determination does not in itself automatically legitimate secession. In re Quebec, the SCC 
held that, ‘… when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination internally, it is entitled as a last resort to exercise it by secession’.213  
Although ethically conventional, this assertion has not been passed as customary law 
through consistent State practice.
214
 Arguably, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the 
ICJ held that in order to prove the existence of a norm of customary international law,  
‘… State practice, including those States whose interests are specifically affected, 
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform...and should have occurred in 
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such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is 
involved’.215  
In addition, considering the historical grievance theory, a secession claim to 
independence is only significant if there is substantial evidence that the entity’s territory was 
unlawfully annexed into the parent State.
216
 The fact that the international community did not 
regard Kosovo’s incorporation into Serbia as an illegal annexation of territory precludes the 
applicability of this abstract theory to territorial entities such as Kosovo. 
Where a people have been a subject of serious and systematic violation of human 
right, international law recognises the theory of remedial secession but this theory remains 
very controversial. The theory encompasses protection of individuals and minority rights with 
secession being an ultimate remedy.
217
   
According to State practice, two distinguished circumstances should be met. First, 
consent between the secessionist entity and the parent State or remaining parties should exist 
of which in most cases, the international community has utmost authorised.
218
 An example of 
this situation conducted on mutual terms is the separation of the Slovak and Czech Republic 
in 1993 
219
 as well as Eritrea and South Sudan. It is argued that the creation of these States 
does not amount to a precedent for secession.  
Rather than holding a referendum for secession, Czech Republic’s independence was 
as a result of a direct process of consensual dissolution achieved by parliamentary procedure 
under the Constitution Act of 1992.
220
 Eritrea and South Sudan was as a result of referendum 
and subsequent consent by parent States. These two instances are not unilateral but 
consensual secession in that the parent States gave up their claims of territorial integrity.  
However, in cases where authorities of the central State are against secession of a part 
of the territory, the reactions of the other States may have great influence to the solution of 
the problem.
221
 Nonetheless, denial of fundamental human rights to group entitled to self-
determination has been invoked in a number of cases.  
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II. SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
Featuring more prominent in contemporary international law is the right of self-determination 
which is also a product of decolonisation. It plays an important role on the creation of States 
in post-colonial era.
222
 While the concept of self-determination is generally recognised as a 
norm of customary international law, it however remains contentious due to its 
indistinguishable character and political nature.
223
 This is because the principle of territorial 
integrity’s supremacy has a bearing that limits the exercise of a right to self-determination.224  
During the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of self-
determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of 
non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation.
225
 Self-determination is a legal right under international law and this is affirmed 
in the UN Charter of and given content in Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1950
226
 and has been 
accepted as a ‘norm’ of jus cogens.227  
Self-determination may be defined as a right of peoples under international law to 
exist and have access to government.
228
 Article 1 (1) of the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains a broad and clear definition of the right: 
‘All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
developments’229 
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Less detailed meaning is also found in Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR) that, ‘All people have a right to existence. They shall have an 
unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination ….’230 
In the context of self-determination, although a certain group of people within an existing 
State do not normally acquire a right to external self-determination – that is the right to 
secede, they do acquire a right to internal self-determination.
231
 Internal self-determination 
denotes the right of a particular people to choose their political status within a State, to 
exercise meaningful political participation, or to preserve their cultural system.
232
 Because 
internal self-determination does not contradict the principle of territorial integrity, it is the 
most preferred concept of self-determination.  
 
a) External self-determination  
 
As we have seen in the preceding section, external self-determination (secession) is 
contentious. This is because it conflicts with a number of fundamental norms of international 
law of which one of the most significant is the principle of territorial integrity.
233
  Under 
Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, territorial integrity is stated and suggests that self-
determination cannot support an action that would dismember or impair the territory or 
political unity of a State.
234
  
However, Resolution 2625 which, according to the ICJ reflects international legal 
custom states that, ‘the principle of territorial integrity will not act to protect States that 
breach the principle of self-determination.
235
 In the Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ stated that,  
‘Article 1 common to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) reaffirms the right of al1 peoples to self-determination, and lays upon the 
States parties the obligation to promote the realisation of that right and to respect it, in 
conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.’236  
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We can see here that there exists uncertainty in respect of law. The right to territorial 
integrity and the right to self-determination are all enshrined in the UN Charter. In Portugal 
v. Australia, the court clearly said that the right of peoples to self-determination is today a 
right erga omnes.
237
 However, in 1998, the SCC supported remedial secession in Reference 
re Secession of Quebec in which it gave a legal right of Quebec to secede from Canada. The 
court found that, ‘international law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the 
explicit denial of such a right’;238 that ‘the right of a people is normally fulfilled through 
internal self-determination’; and that the right to external self-determination (secession) arises 
only in the most extreme cases’.239  
It is argued that the SCC inferred a right to external self-determination (secession) in 
extreme cases where a people are found to be oppressed. In the Katangese People v Zaire, the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights held that, the Katangese people did not 
enjoy the right to secede because they failed to exhaust attempts to exercise greater internal 
self-determination and there was no evidence of oppression or human rights abuses on the 
part of the central government.
240
 The Commission stated: 
‘In the absence of a concrete evidence of violation of human rights to the point that the 
territorial integrity of Zaire should be called into question ..., Katanga is obliged to excise a 
variant of self-determination that is incompatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Zaire’241 
In addition, based on Resolution 2625 (XXV), the Kosovo Advisory Opinion is found to 
be in support of remedial secession. Judges Cancado Trindade and Yusuf both held that: ‘the 
right of a State to demand territorial integrity was lost when it failed to accord internal self 
determination to a people within its territory and violated a human right of such a people….’ 
242
 However, it is unclear whether the UN Member States collectively supported this opinion.  
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III. SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT SECESSION 
 
Secession does not create problems where the parent State consents but problems arise where 
the government insists on respect of its territorial integrity. In practice, recognition plays a 
major role in determining the success of a particle secession.
243
. In 2006, Montenegro 
peacefully seceded from its parent State, Serbia with the consent of Serbia. In the 2011 
referendum, South Sudan overwhelmingly voted for independence from Sudan and the 
central government of Sudan accepted the decision. South Sudan is now an independent 
State.  
Below are selected examples of successful and unsuccessful attempts at secession. Some 
provide evidences where secession is supported while others undermine any arguments for a 
right to secede - external self-determination in international law. 
 
a) Eritrea  
 
Eritrea was colonised by Italy from 1890 to 1941 after which became under control of Great 
Britain until 1952.
244
 Under the auspice of the UN, Eritrea was merged with Ethiopia in 
1952.
245
 This was after the 1950 General Assembly Resolution 390 A (V) that established 
Eritrea as “an autonomous entity federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the 
Ethiopian Crown”.246 However, in 1962, the federation was unilaterally abolished and 
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie put aside Eritrea’s autonomy. 247   
For many years that followed, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) fought for 
total independence of Eritreans from Ethiopia.
248
 It was not until 1993 after Ethiopia 
recognised the legitimate claims of Eritreans. The Eritreans were accorded an opportunity to 
hold a referendum in which 99.8 per cent overwhelmingly voted for independence.
249
  
Eventually in 1993, Eritrea was created with the unequivocal consent of the Ethiopian 
government and approval by the UN, thereby distinguishing it as a model for unilateral 
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secession.
250
 With the support of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Eritrea was 
admitted to the UN in 1993.
251
 It is concluded that Eritrea’s secession was successful in that 
the parent State consented to its secession rendering this modal, a consensual secession. 
 
b) South Sudan 
 
A more recent case of secession is that of South Sudan, a territory which was part of Sudan. 
Until 1962, South Sudan under South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) attempted to 
secede and gain independence by waging a war against the central government of Sudan.
252
 
Subsequent to many years of consistent policy of ethnic war in Sudan, South Sudan’s attempt 
to secede at the time did not succeed because the parent State, Sudan and the international 
community objected to South Sudan’s claims for external self-determination.253  
In 1972, the South Sudanese settled for internal self-determination and became an 
autonomous territory within the framework of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement.
254
 
However, due to South Sudan’s struggle to achieve full independence and owing to 
suppression of the black Sudanese in the South by Sudanese government, internal conflict 
ensued up until January 2011 when a peace agreement was made. South Sudan was permitted 
to hold a referendum in which 98.83 per cent of its people voted to secede from Sudan.
255
 A 
day following its declaration of independence, the central government of Sudan declared its 
formal recognition of South Sudan’s independence.256 In July 2011, South Sudan was 
admitted to the UN as a Member State.
257
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In African history, secession of the South Sudanese can be considered as an exceptional 
case. The international community supported South Sudanese claims to self-determination 
because they demonstrated capacity to become a nation; as such, should be entitled to 
sovereignty and recognition as a State.
258
  
South Sudan is among the successful States that seceded from the parent State in the 
context of post-colonial era. The exercise depicts that where the parent State surrenders its 
claim to territorial integrity, the international community recognises the emergence of a new 
State.
259
 Since the parent State consented to South Sudan’s secession, unilateral secession is 
deemed absent. Sudan relinquished its claim to territorial integrity by legislating a clear 
mechanism for secession. Where there is consent by a parent State, the legality of this act 
falls within self-determination and this is rather consensual than unilateral secession. 
 
c) Kosovo  
 
Kosovo was an autonomous territory of the Republic of Serbia, a State which was at the time 
within Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).
260
 The territory had a population of 
approximately 2 million of whom 90 per cent were Albanian ethnic group.
261
 Due to 
extensive repression from Serbia, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from its parent 
State on February 17, 2008.
262
  
Despite objections from Serbia, the western States were quick to recognise Kosovo as 
a State. In the inquiry of Aaland Islands Commission, the Jurists argued many factors that 
besides the majority sentiment of the population, other relevant factors to the question of 
whether demands for self-determination should in fact lead to the transfer of sovereignty 
were considered.
263
 Similarly, other factors may have been considered in granting recognition 
to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. These may be severe form of discrimination 
against the Kosovars Albanians and existence of gross human rights violations.  
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Despite resilient protest by Serbs, the United States formally recognised Kosovo as a 
sovereign and independent new State in 2008.
 264
 A number of other States such as the United 
Kingdom, France and Belgium have so far recognised Kosovo as a State.
265
 However, 
countries such as Russia, China, Serbia and Spain which face their own separatist issues have 
not recognised Kosovo as a State.
266
 Russia and Serbia have argued that Resolution 1244 
does not allow the secession of Kosovo without the consent of Serbia. In particular, they refer 
to the resolution’s preamble language ‘reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’267 
In 1999, the UN Security Council created an interim UN administration in Kosovo but 
the legal status of Kosovo remains that of an autonomous entity under international 
administration: thus preserving the territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro.
268
 While 
‘external self-determination’, or secession is disfavoured by legal scholars, the SCC found 
that ‘a right to external self-determination which, in re secession of Quebec case potentially 
takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession, arises only in the most 
extreme cases. Even so, it is only under careful defined circumstances that secession may be 
permitted.
269
  
As noted in Resolution 1244 ‘a grave humanitarian situation’, a threat to international 
peace and security, the Serbs persistently committed atrocities against Albanians.
270
 Against 
this background, Hilpold argued that it is without doubt that Kosovo qualified for internal and 
external self-determination or secession from Serbia.
271
 It is also argued that in principle; 
Kosovo's secession from Serbia may be justified based on the given situation of human rights 
violation of the Kosovars by Serbians. Therefore, Kosovo’s declaration of independence and 
secession should be permitted.  
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However, despite Kosovo’s recognition by a number of existing States and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with other States in the international community, 
Kosovo is not a member of the United Nations.
272
 As Vidmar argued, its success in the UN 
Charter era is implausible and depends on the legality and legitimacy of such a mode of State 
creation and international recognitions.
273
 In accordance with international law, its external 
self-determination and unilateral secession remain unsuccessful. 
 
d) Biafra 
 
In 1967, the Ibos of Nigeria were subjected to massacre and systematic riot. Following a 
series of oppression, injustice and complex political disorders that led to the killing of many 
civilians, the people of Biafra attempted to secede from the Federation of Nigeria and 
established the Republic of Biafra.
274
  
On May 30, 1967, Biafra unilaterally declared its independence from the Eastern 
region of Nigeria. Okoronkwo argued that the human rights denial of and the unclear 
developmental prospects for the people of Biafra compelled them to secede.
275
 It can be 
further argued that the mass violation of human rights provided a justification for the people 
of Biafra to exercise their rights of self-determination.  
Generally, Biafra’s attempted secession received less external support. Only five 
States - Zambia, Tanzania, Ivory Coasts, Gabon and Haiti recognised Biafra though none of 
these States established diplomatic relations with Biafra.
276
 The rest of existing States found 
that Biafra did not qualify to be recognised as a State. 
277
However, the central government 
was strongly supported by the OAU but there was no involvement of the UN.
278
  
Biafra’s attempt at unilateral secession is concluded as unsuccessful and at no point 
was it recognised as a State by a considerable number of existing States.  
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e) Katanga 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - formerly known as Zaire was colonised by 
Belgium and became independent on 30 June 1960.
279
 Eleven days later, with considerable 
external support, Katanga’s DRC rich mineral province declared its independence.280 Due to 
significant external support, Katanga Government was considerably more stable than the 
central government of the DRC at the time.
281
  However, in January 1963, with the assistance 
of UN forces, Katanga province’s attempt to secede was crushed.282 In the Katangese 
Peoples' Congress v Zaire, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(ACHPR) held that,  
‘the right of Katangese to secede from Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo) … 
any right to self-determination possessed by the Katangese must be exercised in 
conformity with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity’. 283 
Several other reasons for the international community's opposition of Katanga 
secession existed. During the early phases of the secession effort, there were concerns by the 
international community that the declared State regime did not represent the wishes of the 
majority of the Katanga population.
284
 Additionally, there were also concerns that the DRC 
could not survive without Katanga, the most viable, populated and economic province of 
DRC. Moreover, the secession was mainly supported by Belgium and other Western States 
who were after protecting their business interests in Katanga.
285
 
 In spite of its claim to self-determination and stability, Katanga was not recognised by 
any State in the international community.
286
 The ACHPR ruled on Katanga’s secession by 
invoking the principle of territorial integrity,
287
 guaranteeing respect for existing boundaries 
proclaimed in Resolution 1524 (XV).
288
 In historical context, the United Nations’ eventual 
disapproval of the Katanga secession is significant. It established a precedent for the 
international community's abandonment of a neutral stance toward a secessionist movement 
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before political and military frustration.  Katanga’s attempt at unilateral secession was 
unsuccessful. 
 
f) Chechnya  
 
Chechnya was an autonomous territory within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic. However, in November 1991, Chechnya unilaterally declared its independence 
from the Russian Federations, the USSR and Ingushetia. Although viewed as illegal by 
Moscow, presidential elections were held in the newly declared republic in which Dzhokhar 
Dudayev was declared a winner of the elections.
289
 Chechnya was left to its own strategies 
and it maintained effective control of its own government.
290
  
In 1994, the Russian army attempted to supress the desires of secessionists through its 
disproportionate force, serious violation of humanitarian law against secessionists.
291
 
Nonetheless, these acts turned unsuccessful and the struggle which resulted in the killing of 
many civilians continued. The conflict in Chechnya remained classified as an internal armed 
conflict and that the principle of territorial integrity applied.
292
 The British and USA 
governments also underscored the significance of respect for territorial integrity. Other than 
calling for minimum and respect for human rights, Britain the USA only denounced the use 
of force by Russia against Chechnya. 
293
  
Admittedly, Chechnya's claim to independence has been rendered illegitimate because 
of the actions of its government’s inability to establish any viable State institutions, a 
situation which appeared unacceptable before the international community. In addition, 
Russia’s right to defend its territorial integrity was strongly supported by the French, British 
and US governments.
294
  
Despite substantial evidence that the Chechen people were subjects of grave human 
rights violations perpetrated by Russian forces during the period 1994 and 1999, recognition 
of Chechnya by the international community never came through. Crawford argued that, 
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‘ … even though other States qualified the Chechens as a ‘people’ and that even 
though these people were subject to violation of human rights and humanitarian law 
on a large scale, the principle of territorial integrity has been respected and 
reaffirmed.’295 
However, stringent application of remedial secession theory avoids approving 
Chechnya’s secession because under remedial secession, Chechnya would still be required to 
negotiate with Russia for secession.
296
 Due to its lack of recognition, Chechnya’s unilateral 
declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 offers clear evidence that there is 
no identifiable precedent for secession.
297
 Chechnya remains an integral territory, a province 
of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Chechnya’s attempt at secession is unsuccessful and the 
principle of territorial integrity has been upheld.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
  
Drawn from this chapter, it has been found that secession is generally a mere fact.  While the 
principle of self-determination has been found to be recognised as a norm of international 
law, unilateral secession has not. It has been established that secession is one of the modes of 
State creation and is also intertwined with self-determination.  
Depending on the available facts, international law neither prohibits unilateral 
secession nor explicitly recognise such a right but does provide a framework within which 
certain secessions are preferred, for example, where there are serious human rights violation 
or where serious discrimination of a particular minority group is perpetrated. State practice 
also demonstrates that under certain conditions, international law recognises secession and 
becomes a legitimatise mode of exercising the right to self-determination. For example, 
where extreme human rights violations have been found to exists.
298
 
It has been argued that attempts at unilateral secession without the consent of a 
parent-State from which the entity is seceding is illegitimate. This is usually because 
territorial integrity of a State takes precedent over a right to self-determination of that State’s 
national minorities. 
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From international law perspective, secession is not illegal nor is suppression of such 
attempts by the government is. While secession has in some instances been denied, remedial 
secession has been allowed in some exceptional circumstances.  
Although there is substantial support among legal scholars for a concept such as 
‘remedial secession’ where a right to secede when grave human rights violation is accepted, 
this concept has not yet developed in contemporary international law.
299
 International law 
might deliberately remain neutral or silent in some issues. In the wording of the SCC’s 
judgement, it is evident that international law neither contain a right of unilateral secession 
nor an explicit denial of such a right.
300
 This could be explained that the international 
community endeavours to maintain stability where the internal self-determination of a 
minority is utterly hindered. The international community has expressed concern that 
secession would open the door for numerous minority regions to claim independence.
301
 
As earlier mentioned, under certain circumstances, the right to unilateral secession 
could be justifiable if the people in question have been subjected to serious violation of their 
fundamental human rights or denied the right of internal self-determination. For example, in 
post-colonial era, Bangladesh (1971) Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011) have 
successfully seceded and claimed independence from a formerly recognised sovereign State. 
These are instances of consensual session.  
Katanga, Chechnya, Kosovo, Biafra, etcetera have been unsuccessful. In the first two 
examples of Eritrea and South Sudan, these have been successful at secession because the 
parents States from which they seceded consented and this act is distinct from unilateral 
secession. The other examples are failed attempts at secession as their nature is of unilateral 
secession. In these cases, the principle of territorial integrity took precedence over 
secession.Among legal scholars, solid circumstances under which secession maybe 
legitimised are still glare. Without concrete position, one is left to wonder as to what degree 
of uniqueness must be deemed to exist before a right to secede is recognised.  
In this chapter, it has also been argued that outside colonial context, State practice is 
reluctant to recognise unilateral secession and so far, there is no State created through 
unilateral secession and without the consent of the parent State that has become a UN 
Member State.  The next chapter assesses Somaliland’s secession and its claim for statehood.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE CASE OF SOMALILAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For Somaliland’s claim of statehood to be successful, it must prove that it satisfies the 
traditional criteria of statehood established under international law, that of a defined territory; 
a permanent population; a government; and the capacity to enter into relations with other 
States. In any case, the nexus between the factual and legal criteria of statehood is crucial.  
Certainly, questions about the nature of statehood and how it is achieved in international 
law are usually raised. As we shall see in this chapter, the four criteria appears not to be 
difficult to fulfil in the case of Somaliland but the absence of recognition preclude the 
Republic of Somaliland from becoming a State accepted as a subject of international law. 
Somaliland‘s claim to statehood will be analysed against the theories of statehood in 
international law – the declaratory and constitutive theories.  
When an entity within a State secedes by claiming a right of self-determination and 
declares itself independent from the parent State, the parent State may lawfully respond by 
preventing the loss of its territory to the seceding entity.
302
 An example is our case study, 
Somaliland where the Republic of Somalia has not consented to Somaliland’s secession. 
Since Somaliland’s declaration as a State in 1991, it has not been recognised by any State but 
has only endured as an autonomous province of the Republic of Somalia.
303
 Somaliland’s 
withdraw from the union with the Republic of Somalia seemed to have had no bearing of 
breaching international law.  
 However, this kind of an act has been the substance of debate as to whether international 
law supports declaration of new independent entities created through secession without the 
consent of the parent State or recognition of the new States by existing States is now a rule of 
customary law.
304
 While some authors argue that the violation of fundamental norms of 
international law such as creation of States through use of force may preclude an entity from 
qualifying as a State,
305
 others argue that the right to territorial integrity of an existing State 
undermine claims to a right of secession particularly in post-colonisation era.
306
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Although there has been a few support for and implied recognition of Somaliland’s 
secession into a new State, other States have declared that Somaliland’s secession is contrary 
to international law and a violation of the Republic of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.
307
 But traditionally, international law remains legally neutral to secession.
308
  
It is argued that a clear position of international law on secession is contained in the 
statement made by the Commission of Jurists appointed by the League of Nations to examine 
the Aaland Islands dispute. The Commission stated that ‘Positive international law does not 
recognise the right of national groups as such, to separate themselves from the State of which 
they form a part by the simple expression of a wish….’309  The Commission’s statement is 
flawless on secession in international law in that it views secession as a threat to sovereign 
rights of a State and a danger to the international community’s interests. This view is 
legitimate in international law because it is supported by State practice. It renders secession 
illegitimate when consent from the parent State is absent. 
Significant to note in the case study of Somaliland is that the continued civil conflicts 
prevailing in Somalia, a United Nations Member State where Somaliland lies has attracted 
attention of the international community and the UN at large. This is in an effort to bring 
peace and stability to Somalia.  
 
a) Historical background of  the Republic of Somaliland  
 
Located in the north-western part of the Horn of Africa, the Republic of Somaliland, borders 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Gulf of Eden and the Indian Ocean.
310
 Formerly a British Protectorate 
(British Somaliland), Somaliland became an independent State from the British rule on 26 
June 1960.
311
 A day later, the Republic of Somaliland’s neighbouring Italian Protectorate 
which was known as Trust Territory of Italian Somaliland (Somalia in modern days), also 
became independent from Italian rule.
312
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On July 1, 1960 British Somaliland (Somaliland) merged with Trust Territory of Italian 
Somaliland (Somalia) under an Act of Union and formed in Morden days, Republic of 
Somalia.
 313
 However, the 1960 union of the two new States was marred with differences 
resulting from different inherited colonial customs.
314
 Two separate legal systems and two 
different ‘official’ languages of governments existed.315 The Somali Republic in the north 
enforced the English common law and the Indian Penal Code while the southerners enforced 
the Italian code.
316
  
In addition, redistribution of economic and natural resources became problematic as 
infrastructure lacked in the northern part of the country.
317
 Since the Act of Union document 
(the Act) was prepared by members from the north, members of the south argued that the 
terms contained in the Act was imposed on them. On the other hand members of the northern 
region were aggrieved on ground that they were side-lined in the process of union.
318
  
As opposed to the Act which required a unitary and centralised State government, the 
Somalis in the south dominated the political and economic activities of the State to which 
those in the north were against as they preferred a federal system of government.
319
 Under the 
leadership of Said Barre who assumed power in 1969, differences between the two regions of 
the country resulted in continued tensions.  
From 1977 to 1978, Somalia was ravaged by war against Ethiopia over the Ogaden 
region.
320
 During the war, many people were killed, hundreds and thousands of civilians fled 
Somalia to neighbouring Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya while others were internally 
displaced.
321
 The war deteriorated the unison between the north and southern regions of 
Somalia. However, even after the war, Somalia continued to experience instability as civil 
war broke out in different parts of the country.
322
  
The emergence refugee crisis and internally displaced persons of the 1977 to 1978 
war aftermath triggered confiscation of land belonging to members of Isaaq majority ethnic 
                                                          
313
 Alexis Arieff ‘De Facto Statehood? The Strange Case of Somaliland’ 2008 Yale Journal of International 
Affairs 60 at 65. 
314
 Crawford op cit note 15 at 413. 
315
 Michael Wall ‘State Formation in Somaliland: Bringing Deliberation to Institutionalism (PhD thesis 2011 
Development Planning Unit UCL) 112. 
316
 Crawford op cit note 15 at 413. 
317
 Ibid. 
318
 Michael Wall ‘State Formation in Somaliland: Bringing Deliberation to Institutionalism (2011) Thesis at 112 
319
 Arieff op cit note 313 at 68. 
320
 Crawford op cit note 15 at 414. 
321
 Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations ‘Somalia Brief background’ available at 
https://www.un.int/somalia/somalia/country-facts, accessed on 28 June 2016. 
322
 Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations ‘Somalia Brief background’ available at 
https://www.un.int/somalia/somalia/country-facts, accessed on 28 June 2016. 
50 
    
 
group (the primary clan family in Somaliland) in the northern part of Somalia.
323
 In 1982, the 
civil war ensued and left approximately 50,000 civilians - mainly of Isaaq clan killed.
324
  
President Siad Barre who held leadership since 1968 autocratically ruled the Somali 
Republic until 1991.
325
 His regime was characterised by discrimination against the Isaaq 
majority ethnic group in the northern region where there was resistance; as a result, the 
northern region of Somali Republic formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) whose 
predominant members were Isaaq majority clans. The SNM’s primary objective was to oust 
the Somali Government led by President Mohammed Siad Barre.
326
  
In approximately 1990, Siad Barre’s regime lost control over most of the parts in the 
northern regions. In January 1991, President Siad Barre fled Mogadishu, the capital city of 
Somalia.
327
 Following the president’s absence, the central government of Somalia collapsed 
and the SNM established territorial control over the borders in the northern regions, the 
former British Somaliland.
328
  
On 17 May 1991, British Somaliland communities which comprised of leaders of Somali 
National Movement (SNM) and clan elders of northern Somalia convened at a Grand 
Conference in Burao and declared the territory of Somaliland as a sovereign and independent 
State.
329
 At the conference, the union with Somalia was revoked; the sovereignty and 
independence of Somaliland was declared and a Provisional Constitution of Somaliland was 
adopted.
330
 The Republic of Somaliland’s territory was based on the borders of the former 
British Somaliland Protectorate.  
Following the disintegration of Somali Government, Somaliland was not the only 
region that declared independence. Other territorial entities such as Puntland in the north-
eastern region declared independence in 1998. Puntland aimed at participating in any Somali 
resolution to form a new central government;
331
 Jubaland seceded in 1998 with the 
declaration of the entity as Jubaland - the territory of which is now known as South Western 
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Somalia with its status uncertain;
332
 Benadirland and Hiranland also declared independence 
in the same year.
333
  
In contrast to Somaliland, disputes over the territory inside Somaliland inhabited by 
clans that belong to the same family such as the Majerteen arose in other territories such as 
Puntland. This is due to the fact that Puntland has a much clan-based administration.
334
 As 
with Somaliland, the territory has experienced a relatively stable atmosphere within its 
claimed borders – the former colonial boundaries.335 The last known clan conflicts within 
Somaliland were in 1997; as a result, a large number of its population fled to neighbouring 
countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.
336
 Additionally, there have been operational 
and governmental institutions as well as a hybrid democratic political system.
337
 Somaliland 
held a referendum and on May 31, 2001, a Constitution was adopted of which Article 1 
provides:- 
“The country which gained its independence from the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland on 26th June 1960 and was known as the Somaliland 
Protectorate … shall hereby and in accordance with this Constitution become a 
sovereign and independent country known as ‘The Republic of Somaliland.’”338 
The Republic of Somaliland’s law-making body is composed of the House of Elders 
and House of Representatives.
339
 Somaliland has held democratic presidential, parliamentary 
and local district elections; and has a three-party political system.
340
 Although these 
structures exist, they do not effectively function to a satisfactory level. The institutions do not 
ensure effective protection of civilian within its claimed territorial borders.
341
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II. THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND UNDER THE CLASSICAL CRITERIA OF 
STATEHOOD 
 
Established on Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, the declaratory theory is a well-
known founding criterion for statehood in international law.
342
 In S v Banda, Friedman J said 
that, ‘The declaratory theory is objective, and considers the requisites of statehood and 
sovereignty on well-established criteria of international law.
343
 That is a State has sovereignty 
if it possesses the Montevideo Convention qualifications.
344
 In the below section, 
Somaliland’s statehood will be examined against the traditional criteria of statehood and its 
effectiveness will be evaluated. It will also be considered against other statehood criterion 
which contradict or complements the Montevideo principle.  
 
a) Permanent population 
 
A State is composed of not only a territory but also a discrete group of individuals.
345
 As of 
2009, Somaliland’s population was estimated at 3.8 million Sunni Muslims; 55 per cent of 
who are nomads while 45 per cent live in rural and urban areas.
346
 Although half of its 
population are nomads, Somaliland meets the permanent population requirement under 
international law. For an entity to qualify as a State the doctrine of international legal system 
does not necessarily require a minimum and fixed number of the inhabitants. Permanent 
population as a criterion is therefore assumed not fixed.
347
  
Somaliland’s permanent population has continued to increase following organised 
reparation exercise undertaken and currently being carried out by the office of the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
348
 The author concludes that Somaliland 
meets the criterion of permanent population.  
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b) Defined territory 
 
Somaliland lies in the north-western part of Somalia. Since 1885 when Britain secured 
Somaliland as a protectorate territory, the border demarcations were made between Ethiopia, 
Djibouti (French Somaliland), Somaliland (British Somaliland), Somalia (Italian Somaliland) 
and Kenya.
349
  
Somaliland’s colonial borders have remained intact. However, Somalia’s objection to 
Somaliland’s secession is based on the fact that subsequent to the five days of independence 
in 1961, Somaliland willingly merged with Somalia and therefore, the reflecting former 
colonial borders demarcated by British treaties with Ethiopia, Italy, and France were altered 
at the time of union.
350
  
Somaliland’s frontiers between its neighbouring entities such as Puntland are clearly 
defined and have existed since the time inherited from the British colony but its borders with 
Puntland are still disputed. However, the dispute does not affect Somaliland’s existence 
because existence of a State is independent of boundary delimitation.
351
  
The legal mechanisms test which the ICJ adopted in resolving international border 
disputes is the doctrine of uti possidetis.
352
 This principle is based on the idea that the 
frontiers of newly independent States should follow the frontiers of the old colonial territories 
from which they emerged and that they cannot be easily altered by unilateral action.
353
 It 
therefore prevents the moving of colonial boundaries. The secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia 
in 1993 took place without violating the principle of uti possidetis. Based on this principle, 
Somaliland satisfies the statehood criterion of a defined territory which has been maintained 
since colonial era. 
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c) Government  
 
In order to occupy a position of a State in international law, Somaliland must have a practical 
identity of a government whose core responsibilities are the international rights and duties of 
a State, self-governing or independent of any other power.
354
  
Somaliland has an established government which is functional and effective – 
controlling most of the territory on which it lays claim.
355
 Although not a prerequisite for 
recognition as an independent State, an indication of a coherent political structure must exist 
to form executive and legislative organs.
356
  
In May 2001, Somaliland adopted a Constitution with an objective of a multi-party 
and democratic system of government.
357
 Somaliland has an elected president and a 
legislative parliament.
358
 Between the three arms of government, Somaliland’s Constitution 
institutes a separation of power and promotes the existence of opposition political parties, 
free media and fundamental human rights and freedoms.
359
 The recent parliamentary and 
local elections were held in 2005 and 2012 respectively while Presidential elections took 
place in 2010. In all these elections, the international and local observers have stated that the 
elections were free and fair.
360
 
Effective and functional government does not mean that an established State loses its 
statehood once effectiveness of the government ceases.
361
 Law, order and stability in a certain 
space of the globe and among a permanent population are of the overriding evidence to 
satisfy the criterion of government. In 1992, the European Community (EC) recognised 
Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina and were admitted to UN membership at the time when 
there was no effective governments in these two States and the territories were substantially 
controlled by non-governmental forces.
362
  
In Somaliland’s case, the relevant factor to consider under international law could be 
the extent to which the area not under the control of the government of Somalia is claimed as 
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separate from de facto control.
363
 Arieff argued that notwithstanding some democratic 
failings, Somaliland has its own independent legal system and hosts a substantial number of 
refugees from southern Somalia. Somaliland’s government commands a liveried military and 
police force,
364
 has a stable government which controls the territory and population it lays 
claim on.
365
  
However, although Somaliland has governmental structures, there is ineffective 
functioning of these structures to satisfactorily ensure effective protection of civilian within 
its claimed territorial borders.
366
 But failure in the established governmental structures does 
not obviate Somaliland from meeting the statehood criterion of government because some 
States have ineffective governments and yet their statehood remains unaffected.  
More arguably, the EU has commended Somaliland’s contribution to peace making, 
good governance, democratic and stability in the Horn of Africa.
367
 As evidenced in the new 
emerged States of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the norms of contemporary international 
law with regard to new States suggests reforms to the criterion of effective control of 
government in the territory claimed by an entity.
368
 Furthermore, Somaliland has its own 
executive and other legal structures through which it conducts its external relations, a 
sincerely democratic government and established legal systems in particular, a Constitution 
and nationality laws.
 369
 This is evidence of statehood.  
On the basis of its autonomy, isolation and separation made up of its permanent 
population and territory, Somaliland meets the traditional and legal statehood criterion of 
organised and effective government.
370
 Although the above mentioned structures exist, 
Somaliland is not legally independent of Somalia. Somaliland’s government is represented by 
the government of Somalia at international level. But this does not disqualify Somaliland 
from meeting the criterion of government.  
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d) Capacity to enter into relationship with other States  
 
A mere declaration of independence does not qualify an entity to possess capacity to enter 
into relations with other States. This is because existing States on the international plane 
should recognise the entity as a new State.
371
 In an effort to gain recognition in the 
international community, Somaliland has substantially entered into relations with 
international bodies and other States in the region.
372
 Somaliland runs its own internal affairs 
in a state-like manner. It has its own currency and issues travel documents to its claimed 
permanent population.
373
 Somaliland has also made external relations with other existing 
States such as Ethiopia. In the Island of Palmas case of arbitration, Judge Huber stated that; 
‘Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. … State in 
regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in settling 
most questions that concern international relations.’374 
Dugard argued that, an entity which is subject to the authority of another State in 
controlling its external affairs cannot be regarded to have met the criterion and cannot be 
defined as an independent State.
375
 In 1910, South Africa had no capacity to enter into 
treaties with other States without the support of Britain;
376
 as such, she was not entitled to be 
considered as an independent State for she did not possess the right to enter into relations 
with other States. It was until after World War I when it became free from Britain that South 
Africa enjoyed the ‘capacity to enter into relations with other States’.377  
The government of Somaliland has entered into a collection of relations with existing 
States as well as intergovernmental organisations with which, it has agreements such as those 
on monitoring of elections, relief and trade, security and counter-terrorism, and 
immigration.
378
 Somaliland has bilateral and multilateral relations with the UN and its 
numerous agencies such as the Arab League, EU and the USA.
379
 As evidenced in the UN’s 
acceptance of Somaliland’s rejection of the presence of UN peacekeepers on its territory, 
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agencies of the UN have tacitly accepted Somaliland’s distinctive status in international 
law.
380
  
The United Kingdom (UK) regards Somaliland as an independent State. The UK 
holds its external affairs with Somaliland through its embassy in Addis Ababa.
381
 The UK 
authority endeavours to support Somaliland’s international efforts to develop a diplomatic 
and viable consensus with Somalia and reach an agreeable solution with regard to their 
impending relationship.
382
 In 2013, Somaliland’s President held a meeting with the European 
Union Envoy to Somaliland and Somalia. The meeting was followed by Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and International Co-operation’s joint press conference in Hargeisa, the capital city of 
Somaliland.
383
 It is argued here that although there exists these relationships, they do not 
necessary constitute recognition of statehood.  
However, Somaliland’s relations with the USA are certainly multifaceted due to the 
tortured history of American policy in the Horn of Africa and the post-2001 Global War on 
Terror. Initially, the USA was particularly unwilling to recognise the self-declared 
autonomous entity in Somalia (which included Somaliland) for fear of fuelling instability in 
the region.
384
 But in 2005, the USA government’s financial aid to monitor Somaliland’s 2005 
parliamentary elections channelled through International Republic Institute is evidence that 
the US has changed its stance toward her relations with Somaliland.
385
 Somaliland’s 
diplomatic representative who is resident in Washington DC is in regular negotiations with 
American counterparts on different issues.
386
 
In the African region, Somaliland’s relation with existing States is complicated. 
Ethiopia is the only State that appears to have established relatively strong relations with 
Somaliland. In 2005, Ethiopia and Somaliland made an agreement which permits Ethiopia to 
use Somaliland’s Berbera Port for international trade.387 Conversely, Eritrea, who is an 
enemy to Ethiopia, does not support Somaliland’s claims of statehood but backs calls for a 
unified Somalia.  
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Furthermore, most Arab States - Egypt in particular, aspires to reconstruct Somalia 
into a regional counterweight to Ethiopia. Egypt called upon Somali leaders to advance a 
national authority and occupy its place in the international community and the Arab family.
388
 
To that effect, the Egyptian government has strategically blocked recognition of Somaliland 
in the Arab League.
389
 This is as a result of the major source of foreign exchange within the 
Arab League Gulf States sourced from remittances by Issaqs, the majority clan members of 
Somaliland working in the Gulf of Aden.
390
 Kenya and Djibouti have maintained a neutral 
stance in their relations with Somaliland though Djibouti has gone further to make trade 
agreements with Somaliland.
391
  
As signified by the Montevideo Convention in the criterion of ‘capacity to enter in 
relations with other States’ each State is established on the basis of independence.392 Taking 
examples of the [Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC)], other than South 
Africa, the ‘Bantustan States’ although they were constitutionally independent under their 
respective Status, they were unable to conduct international relations and therefore could not 
qualify as States.
393
 They were considered to lack capacity to enter into relations with other 
States. In the South African case of S v Banda where the statehood of Bophuthatswana was 
tested, Friedman J held that,  
‘… in regard to its capacity to enter into relations with other States, Bophuthatswana 
has a Foreign Minister, … The fact that it is precluded from doing so due to political 
considerations in no way detracts or derogates from its ability to do so…, although it 
has the capacity to do so, depends on the attitude and response of other States.’394  
Not only the TBVC entities possess this status, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) is in a similar situation. In the European case of Calgar v Bellingham the 
Commissioners held that TRNC could not qualify as a State because of its non-functional 
independence and also its incapability to enter into relations with other States.
395
 Politics and 
economic conditions are some of the conditions relevant to consider when determining 
independence of an entity in international law.
396
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Apart from a few Western States, there is no sufficient evidence that Somaliland has 
entered into relation with other States. It is concluded that Somaliland does not satisfy the 
statehood criterion of ‘capacity to enter into relations with other States’.  
 
III. THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND AND RECOGNITION 
 
During its five days of independence, Somaliland’s independence was recognised by 35 
States and was registered at the UN.
397
 Recognition of Somaliland’s independence is now 
considered to have been conducted prematurely. At the time, requirements of a State or 
government were less stringent than it had been thought.
398
  However, it could have been 
presumed that Somaliland gained independence from British colonial powers and the UN was 
in support because Somaliland was considered to possess rights of governing its territory.
399
  
Due to its close ties with Somaliland, Ethiopia is one State that has so far exhibited an 
implied recognition of Somaliland as a State.
400
 This is demonstrated by Ethiopia’s 
negotiated bilateral agreements with the government of Somaliland. In 2000, the elected 
President of Somaliland was received in Addis Ababa with presidential honour like any other 
president in the world. The Somaliland president held bilateral talks and negotiated 
agreements with the Ethiopian Federal Government.
401
 The Ethiopian Prime Minister has 
reportedly stated Ethiopia’s stance over Somaliland’s independence to which it is in favour. 
Beginning of 2002, Ethiopian authorities recognise and accept Somaliland’s travel 
documents.
402
  
The USA does not recognise Somaliland despite its gradual close ties with Hargeisa, 
Somaliland. This could be because the African Union (AU) members have not recognised 
Somaliland as a State.
403
 Some European countries have also related with Somaliland as a de 
facto government. This is evidenced by the European Commission (EC)’s extensive 
development and humanitarian aid programs through Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) operating in Somaliland. 
404
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On the other hand, agencies of the United Nations have tacitly recognised Somaliland’s 
separate status. The UNHCR, World Food Program (WFP) and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) all have conducted negotiations with Somaliland authorities, a stance 
which implies that recognition of Somaliland as a State is intended.
405
  
There are at least four offices in Somaliland established by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) aimed at supporting and strengthening Somaliland’s 
legislative bodies and economic developments
406
. These offices carry out their economic and 
developmental objective activities directly with Somaliland’s local authorities.407 More 
arguably, the UN-HABITAT agency administers a Somaliland Urban Development 
Program.
408
 
Implicitly, the British Government tacitly treat Somaliland as an independent State. In its 
parliamentary session of December 2007, the Minister of State, Mark Malloch Brown stated 
that the British policy was to;  
‘Support international efforts to develop a peaceful and sustainable democracy in Somaliland 
[and] encourage the Somaliland authorities to engage in constructive dialogue with the 
transitional federal government to agree [on] a mutually acceptable solution regarding their 
future relationship’.409 
Harris argued that a State may exist without being formally recognised. Whether or not it 
has been formally recognised by other States, it has a right to be treated by them as a State.
410
 
According to this view, a State may exist without being recognised, and if it does exist in 
fact, then whether or not it has been formally recognised by other States, it has a right to be 
treated by them as such. Therefore, recognition can only be considered as a political act 
recognising a pre-existing State of affairs. For example, Russia has been unsympathetic to 
calls for recognition of Somaliland because this would have direct implications on its‘s 
position on Chechnya’s independence.  
The United Nations has remained silent on either collective recognition or non-
recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Although a few existing States have implied 
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recognition of Somaliland as a State, the fact remains that Somaliland is not recognised as a 
State in the international community. Despite a wide range of contacts and several diplomatic 
visits to Somaliland, there is no State that has officially recognised Somaliland as a State.  
Due to its lack of capacity to enter into relations with other States, Somaliland does not 
satisfy the traditional criteria of statehood in international law. Additionally, without 
recognition by existing States, Somaliland is not a State. In S v Banda, Friedman J stated that, 
‘… substantial element of the constitutive view is subjective ….411  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the traditional objective criteria of statehood set out in the Montevideo Convention, 
this chapter has demonstrated that Somaliland partly meets the traditional criteria that would 
qualify her to be a State in international law. Also, Somaliland relatively satisfies suggested 
additional criteria. From the international legal point of view, Somaliland has a permanent 
population of 3.8 million Sunni Muslims. Secondly, it has a defined territory which is 
determined on the basis of the boundaries fixed by colonial powers. Although there are 
territorial disputes with its neighbours such as Puntland, international law does not 
necessarily require absolute demarcated boundaries.
412
  
Thirdly, Somaliland has a functional and effective government which is stable and 
functions in an orderly manner thus, exercising control and effective authority over the 
territory it lays claims on.
413
 Fourthly, although there is insufficient evidence of Somaliland‘s 
capacity to enter into relations with other States, it has been demonstrated that a few States 
have so far entered into relations with Somaliland. This is proven by Somaliland entering into 
relations with other States such as Ethiopia, UK and the USA. Somaliland has a Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs who operate diplomatic missions in the USA, the UK, Italy and 
Ethiopia; it also hosts high level delegation missions to Somaliland and Somalia.
414
 However, 
it is unclear whether these relations are correctly forceful because internationally, the 
government of Somalia still acts on behalf of Somaliland. 
In principle, the Republic of Somaliland fulfils the Montevideo Convention 
requirements for statehood in international law. Therefore, under the declaratory theory, the 
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Republic of Somaliland is a State in international law. In S v Banda, the court held that, 
Bophuthatswana satisfied these requirements and was therefore a sovereign independent State 
possessing majestas not only according to the law of Bophuthatswana and that of South 
Africa, but also according to the principles of international law.
415
 However, due to its non-
recognition, Somaliland is not a State.  
With international legal scholars still unable to provide a dependable solution to the 
question of whether the creation of a new State through unilateral secession is in accordance 
with international law, the case of Somaliland’s secession and declaration of independence is 
far from being settled.  
In contemporary international law, unilateral secession or mere declaration of 
independence does not qualify an entity to become a State. In addition, neither satisfying the 
criteria of Montevideo Convention qualifies an entity to become a State but recognition by 
existing States plays a significant role in the creation of States. 
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CHAPTER V: GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
In this thesis, the notion of statehood, its classical traditional and additional criteria under 
international law have been established. The criteria of statehood have undergone significant 
changes since its formal conception from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In the 20th and 
21st centuries, issues of statehood have shifted from being a ‘matter of law’ to being regarded 
as a ‘matter of fact’.  
Additionally, the development of additional and suggested criteria for statehood and 
analysis of recognition in contemporary international law have been underscored. It has been 
argued that for an entity to become a State, satisfying additional criteria and recognition by 
other State are key elements of State creation in contemporary international law. The 
fundamental discussion revolves around the question of whether the creation of States is 
dependent on or independent of recognition by the existing States. Opinions and views have 
been expressed by legal scholars but contentious issues of recognition remain unresolved.   
It has also been argued that the doctrine of secession is far from being settled in 
international law. It has been established that clear misperception about secession and right to 
secession exists among legal writers. International law does neither grant sub-State entities a 
general right to secede from their parent States nor does it prohibit secession.
416
 The 
vagueness surrounding secession subjects the notion to an issue of contention in international 
law.  
A central objective in this project was the concept of statehood and unilateral 
secession in international law. Outside the context of colonial system, the exercise of the right 
to self-determination does not usually result in creation of a State; it can only be achieved 
with the consent of the parent State, through constitutional framework or follow an initial 
declaration of independence or consensual secession.  
Other than Bangladesh, Eritrea and South Sudan, there is no unilateral secession that 
has so far been successful in post-colonial context. As seen in this thesis, a number of entities 
attempted secession from their parent States but have not been successful. There is no 
evidence that international law unequivocally supports non-consensual creation of a new 
State on a territory of an existing State. Analysis of the international conventions, UN 
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Resolutions and State practice reveals that international law neither recognises nor prohibits 
secession. 
Additionally, neither a mere declaration of independence nor satisfaction of the 
traditional statehood criteria of permanent population, defined territory, government and 
capacity to enter into relations with other States does necessary infer an entity the status of a 
subject of international law (State). In accordance with international law, it has been argued 
that an entity which satisfies the criteria of statehood does not automatically become a State. 
Recognition though not a rule of customary law, is a requirement.   
States are not created through application of the indicia criteria (the Montevideo 
criteria or additional criteria of statehood). As rightly stated in Vidmar’s view, States emerge 
out of a political process whereby a declaration of independence is accepted as in the case of 
Somaliland. Vidmar concluded that, the criteria of statehood (Montevideo and the additional 
criteria) are at the best, policy guidelines, rather than legal norms. On the other hand, an 
entity which does not achieve the traditional criteria is also not prohibited from becoming a 
State.  
In some cases if not all, an entity may fulfil the traditional criteria of statehood but 
may not be accorded the status of statehood. This is because of the political nature of State 
practice. For example, Kosovo and Somaliland fulfil the traditional legal criteria of statehood 
but are not recognised as States in international law. This is due to the political element of 
recognition. Shaw on the other hand argued that, recognition is a method of accepting factual 
situations and endowing them with legal significance, a relationship which is complex to 
resolve. Due to the political nature of recognition, States have no obligation to granting 
recognition; as such, some States remain unrecognised, practically on political grounds. 
Vidmar also argued that the withholding of recognition is not always a matter of policy, but 
may be required by international law. 
Based on State practice and the suggested additional criteria for statehood, these 
elements complement the traditional statehood criteria. An entity which fails to meet the new 
criteria cannot emerge as a new State. For instance, a State created as a result of breaching jus 
cogens cannot qualify to become a State hence its creation is illegal and cannot produce legal 
rights to the wrongdoer. However, additional criteria have been suggested but they are still 
questionable as to whether they are sufficient and necessary for Statehood in international 
law. 
Despite Somaliland acting as a State for more than two decades, its existence as a 
State cannot be achieved without recognition by existing States and subsequent admission to 
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the United Nations. However, the theories of recognition are disputable and legal scholars 
remain divided. But as other scholars have argued, State creation is a matter of fact and not 
law. For instance Kosovo’s statehood is a fact because in due course, Kosovo will be widely 
recognised as a State. However, in the case of Somaliland, there is clear evidence that lack of 
exceptional attributes required to attract widespread international recognition negates 
Somaliland to becoming a State in international law. 
It is concluded that fulfilling the traditional criteria of statehood does not create a 
State unless recognition of a new claimant entity is made by existing States. The legitimacy 
of unilateral secession remains unclear. Although Somaliland has unilaterally seceded and 
has fulfilled the traditional criteria of statehood, without recognition Somaliland’s secession 
is unsuccessful. According to contemporary international law, Somaliland is not a State.  
Somaliland is hopeful that it will eventually be recognised as a State. However, it is 
torn in between a blocked choice of attempting reconciliation with a failed State or remains in 
the limbo of non-recognition by the international community. The international community 
still recognises Somalia as a State and secession of Somaliland would violate the territorial 
integrity of the parent State, Somalia.  
While the UN Charter recognises a right of self-determination, the same Charter 
guarantees the territorial integrity of its Member States. As such, Member States within the 
international community are obliged to uphold the integrity of Somalia. It is recommended 
that Somaliland should seek Somalia’s consent for approval of its declaration of 
independence and unilateral secession.  
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